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EXPORTING INTERNET LAW THROUGH
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS:
RECALIBRATING U.S. TRADE POLICY IN
THE DIGITAL AGE
Markham C. Erickson & Sarah K. Leggin *

I. INTRODUCTION
The United States recently concluded negotiations over a major, new multilateral trade agreement known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”). 1 Negotiations continue over two other major trade agreements. One is a negotiation with the European Union over what is known as the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (“T-TIP”). 2 The other involves negotiations with
twenty-three countries over what is known at the Trade in Services Agreement
(“TiSA”). 3 In total, the three agreements involve 54 countries, representing a
total of 40%, 50%, and 70% of global gross domestic product (“GDP”) respectively and will serve as a global template for future trade agreements for many
years. 4 In short, in the trade universe, they are a big deal.
Unfortunately, from what we can discern from these agreements, they fail to
*

Markham Cho Erickson is a partner at Steptoe & Johnson LLP, where he works in the
Telecommunications, Internet, and Media practice group. He also serves as the general
counsel to the Internet Association. Sarah Leggin is an associate at Steptoe & Johnson LLP,
working in the Telecommunications, Internet, and Media practice group. This article is not
necessarily a reflection of any views of any client of Steptoe & Johnson.
1
The
Trans-Pacific
Partnership,
OFFICE
OF
U.S.
TRADE
REP.,
http://1.usa.gov/1BmqyjX (last visited Feb. 7, 2016).
2
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP.,
http://1.usa.gov/1RwnYhc (last visited Feb. 7, 2016) [hereinafter T-TIP].
3
Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), EUROPEAN COMM’N ON TRADE,
http://bit.ly/1rJKR2H (last visited Feb. 7, 2016) [hereinafter TiSA-EU].
4
Lydia DePillis, Everything You Need to Know About the Trans-Pacific Partnership,
WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 2013), http://wapo.st/1TzUpMR; Samuel Benka, What Are the Benefits of the TTIP?, AM. TRADE POL’Y (Feb. 3, 2014), http://bit.ly/1WJr4yV; The Trade In
Services Agreement (TISA), COAL. OF SERV. INDUS., http://bit.ly/1rJKR2H (last visited Feb.
7, 2016).
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adequately address a key driver in today’s global economy, namely the Internet. Indeed, current U.S. trade policy does not adequately address the importance of the Internet’s many contributions. 5 Given the Internet’s importance
to the future of economic growth, innovation, and democratic discourse, Congress and the executive branch should recalibrate asymmetrical trade policies
that overweigh priorities of an older economy and under emphasize priorities
of today’s Internet economy.
This article proposes a recalibration of U.S. trade policy and the existing
trade apparatus to better reflect the importance of the Internet and the laws that
have made its rise possible. First, this article will review the current status of
negotiations and amendments to U.S. trade legislation and agreements, which
provide opportunities to implement these proposed reforms. Second, this article will discuss the four laws that make the Internet work. Third, it will review
the evolution of U.S. trade policy with changing economies and consumer demands, and identify areas within U.S. trade authorities where reforms could be
made. Finally, this article will propose structural and administrative reforms
that would promote stronger Internet trade policy.
A. Status of Trade Promotion Authority and Current Trade Negotiations
Negotiations over TPP began in November 2009 when leaders of Australia,
Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam,
and the United States announced consensus over the framework for a new
trade agreement. 6 Since that time, Canada and Mexico have been added to the
negotiations. 7 Negotiations resulting in an agreement concluded on October 5,
2015. 8 The agreement was the culmination of nineteen formal negotiating
rounds involving more than twenty negotiating groups and undoubtedly countless more informal multilateral and bilateral discussions. 9
T-TIP is a trade and investment agreement being negotiated between the
U.S. and European Union, which is intended to increase trade, create over 13

5
See generally WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41145, THE FUTURE OF
U.S. TRADE POLICY: AN ANALYSIS OF ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR THE 112TH CONGRESS 6-7,
16-17 (2011), http://bit.ly/1QSf4wM.
6
Overview of the Trans Pacific Partnership, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP.,
http://1.usa.gov/1K2rx9p (last visited Feb. 7, 2016).
7
Trans-Pacific Partnership: Summary of U.S. Objectives, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP.,
http://1.usa.gov/1BmqyjX (last visited April, 16, 2016) [hereinafter TPP U.S. Objectives].
8
Press Release, John Kerry, U.S. Dep’t of State, Successful Conclusion of TransPacific Partnership (TPP) Negotiations (Oct. 5, 2015), http://1.usa.gov/1QFVYKm.
9
Chronology of Events and Key Milestones, GLOB. AFFS. CANADA (Feb. 2, 2016),
http://bit.ly/1qL48D5.
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million jobs, and stimulate economic growth for both parties. 10 The combined
GDP of the U.S. and EU represent 50% of the world GDP, so the impact of TTIP on both economies is projected to be significant. 11 Negotiations began in
2013, and the latest round of negotiations were conducted in October 2015 in
Miami, Florida. 12
TiSA is an agreement aimed at improving and expanding trade in services. 13
The agreement was initiated by the U.S. and Australia, and its participants
have grown to fifty-one countries—representing 70% of the world’s trade in
services. 14 This is the first update to the latest major services agreement, the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”), which was established by
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in 1995. 15
The key to the Obama Administration’s ability to successfully conclude the
agreements was passage by Congress of so-called fast track negotiating authority. 16 Such power is contained in Trade Promotion Authority (“TPA”) legislation, in which Congress defines U.S. negotiating objectives and maintains the
authority to review and ultimately decide whether any proposed U.S. trade
agreement submitted by the executive branch will be implemented. 17 TPA
gives Congress the ability to vote, to approve, or disapprove a negotiated trade
agreement; however, it precludes the legislative body from amending the negotiated agreement. Administrations in both the past and present argue that this
straight, up-or-down voting process gives the Office of the United States Trade
Representative (“USTR”) greater ability to successfully negotiate complex
trade agreements. 18 Congress passed TPA legislation on June 25, 2015, 19 and
President Obama signed it into law on June 29, 2015. 20 Prior to this legislation,
Congress last approved TPA legislation in 2002. 21 This means that it had been
T-TIP, supra note 2.
Benka, supra note 4.
12 11th Round Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Negotiations, OFFICE OF
U.S. TRADE REP., http://1.usa.gov/1U53zSJ (last visited Feb. 7, 2016).
13 TiSA-EU, supra note 3 (“TiSA aims at opening up markets and improving rules in
areas such as licensing, financial services, telecoms, e-commerce, maritime transport, and
professionals moving abroad temporarily to provide services.”).
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 ‘Fast-track’ trade bill passes US Senate and awaits Obama nod, BBC NEWS (June
25, 2015) [hereinafter ‘Fast-track’ trade bill], http://bbc.in/1LwlnCt.
17 Trade Promotion Authority, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., http://1.usa.gov/1F3Gq9c
(last visited Feb. 7, 2016).
18 Id. (“Updating TPA ensures our trading partners know U.S. negotiators have the support of Congress when we call for greater ambition and stronger, high-standard trade agreements.”).
19 ‘Fast-Track’ trade bill, supra note 16.
20 Greg Nelson, On Trade, Here’s What the President Signed into Law, WHITE HOUSE
(June 29, 2015, 3:55 PM), http://1.usa.gov/1egmEzi.
21 IAN F. FERGUSSON & RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43491, TRADE
10
11
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fifteen years—or nearly 70% of the life of the commercial Internet—since
Congress last gave an Administration the subject matter, objectives, and priorities for a trade negotiation. In those fifteen years, USTR negotiated nearly sixty agreements. 22
Fifteen years ago, when Congress last assigned USTR its trade priorities,
only 8.1% of the world was online. 23 Most consumers still used dial-up connections, as only 21% of Internet users had broadband service. 24 Many consumers still accessed content through the “walled garden” of information provided by portals, with no significant choice of websites or service providers. 25
There were only 3% of the number of websites available today. 26 Facebook had
not yet launched, and there were no significant video streaming video services
like Netflix. 27 In other words, the nature and use of the Internet have evolved
significantly since Congress last provided the Administration with a list of
trade priorities. Consequently, it is no wonder that U.S. trade policy did not
meaningfully evolve during this key fifteen-year timeframe. Unfortunately,
even though Congress is updating “goals-and-objectives” mandate for USTR,28
Congress likewise does not appear poised to comprehensively change its priorities in light of the role that Internet plays on the global stage.
The USTR has described TPP as a new kind of agreement that reflects the
PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA): FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 6 (2015),
http://bit.ly/1QqNDYS.
22 Forty-two Trade and Investment Framework agreements have been initiated from
2002 to present. See Trade and Investment Framework Agreements, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE
REP., http://1.usa.gov/1obJai7 (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). 17 Free Trade agreements have
been initiated from 2002 to present. See Free Trade Agreements, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE
REP., http://1.usa.gov/1T5hRT7 (last visited Jan. 7, 2016).
23 Internet Users, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://bit.ly/1w1NWRy (last visited Feb. 6,
2016).
24 JOHN B. HORRIGAN & LEE RAINIE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE BROADBAND DIFFERENCE: HOW ONLINE BEHAVIOR CHANGES WITH HIGH-SPEED INTERNET CONNECTIONS 9
(2002), http://pewrsr.ch/1KLjWBE.
25 Salil K. Mehra, Paradise is a Walled Garden? Trust, Antitrust, and User Dynamism
18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 889, 894 (2011) (“The term ‘walled garden’ typically refers to restrictions on user access or abilities that are, in some way, limited.”).
26 Total Number of Websites, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://bit.ly/1UxmqaH (last visited
Feb. 6, 2016); see also Anna Jane Grossman, What Online Internet Websites Looked Like in
2001, MOTHERBOARD (Sept. 12, 2011, 9:41 AM), http://bit.ly/1QFFAcB (noting that in 2001
the majority of Americans did not have internet).
27 Facebook was founded on Feb. 4, 2004. Nicholas Carlson, At Last – The Full Story of
How Facebook Was Founded, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 6, 2010, 4:10 AM),
http://read.bi/1BtwXGn. Netflix added an online streaming service in mid 2007. Nate Anderson, Netflix offers streaming movies to subscribers, ARSTECHNICA (Jan. 16, 2007, 11:02
AM), http://bit.ly/20XyEZx.
28 See generally OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., EXEC. OFFICE OF PRESIDENT, STRATEGIC
PLAN FY 2013 – FY 2017, at 6-26 (2013), http://1.usa.gov/1oBQF1y.
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characteristics of the modern economy. 29 As the outlines to the agreement
states, the TPP is “a landmark, 21st-century trade agreement, setting a new
standard for global trade and incorporating next-generation issues that will
boost the competitiveness of TPP countries in the global economy.” 30
USTR has promised that T-TIP “will be a cutting edge agreement aimed at
providing greater compatibility and transparency in trade and investment regulation, while maintaining high levels of health, safety, and environmental protection. T-TIP presents an extraordinary opportunity to strengthen the bond
between vital strategic and economic partners.” 31
According to USTR:
TiSA will encompass state-of-the-art trade rules aimed at promoting fair and open
trade across the full spectrum of service sectors—from telecommunications and technology to distribution and delivery services. TiSA will also take on new issues confronting the global marketplace, like restrictions on cross-border data flows that can
disrupt the supply of services over the Internet—a rapidly expanding market for U.S.
small businesses and entrepreneurs. And TiSA will support the development of
strong, transparent, and effective regulatory policies, which are so important to enabling international commerce. 32

The public’s ability to verify the veracity of such statements is limited. That
is because the United States and its negotiating partners keep the texts of the
agreements secret until the end of the negotiations. 33 Select members of Congress are able to review drafts of various provisions, which seems the very
minimum kind of accommodation that can be afforded to the branch of government that has been given the constitutional authority to regulate trade. 34 In
addition, there are hundreds of “cleared advisors” representing various sectors
of the economy that are able to review portions of the drafts confidentially. 35
29 Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP.,
http://1.usa.gov/1QUf3UC (last visited Feb. 7. 2016) (“The TPP promotes innovation,
productivity, and competitiveness by addressing new issues, including the development of
digital economy…”).
30 Outlines of TPP, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., http://1.usa.gov/1GprfLV (last visited
Feb. 7, 2016).
31 T-TIP, supra note 2.
32 Trade in Services Agreement, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., http://1.usa.gov/1SgvBtI
(last visited Sept. 14, 2015).
33 JOHN HILARY, WAR ON WANT, THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP: 2015 UPDATE 26-27 (2015), http://bit.ly/1VEGkwS (“In a move reminiscent of
Cold War espionage, the European Commission has even tagged official TTIP documents
with secret markings in order to be able to trace any leaks back to their source.”).
34 U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 3 (“United States Congress shall have power “[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.”).
35 Henry Farrell, Five Key Questions – and Answers – about the Leaked TPP Text,
WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2013), http://wapo.st/1QejN6z; TTIP: Already Disrupting Europe’s
Precautionary Principle? AGRIC. & RURAL CONV. 2020 (Aug. 10, 2014),
http://bit.ly/1QejPv9.
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However, until drafts are final, they are not made available to the larger public,
which has caused critics of these agreements to complain that there should be
more transparency in the process as well as a means for the general public to
provide more meaningful input. 36 Whether texts of negotiations should be
made public, and when, is beyond the scope of this article.
Of course, it may not be surprising that throughout the negotiations, unofficial leaked versions of the agreements are routinely made available on the Internet. 37 The usefulness of leaked texts is limited, however, because they represent only a snapshot of the negotiations. Governments are forced to disavow
any allegiance or opposition to the texts, so there is no way of knowing with
certainty how up-to-date or accurate is any given leaked text.
B. The Significance of the Internet
The Internet 38 has become in its short commercial lifespan a key engine for
global economic growth, innovation, and democratic discourse. Beginning in
earnest with the Internet’s commercial launch in the mid-1990s, by 2011 the
Internet increased per capita GDP by $500 in mature countries over fifteen
years. 39 This growth generated by the Internet Revolution is equivalent to the
growth generated by the Industrial Revolution after fifty years. 40 Between 2004
and 2009, the digital economy was the fastest growing sector of the U.S. economy, representing 15% of U.S. GDP growth during that period. 41
Over $8 trillion are exchanged through e-commerce each year. 42 About two36 Farrell, supra note 35; Taylor Wofford, What is the Trans-Pacific Partnership and
Why are Critics Upset By It?, NEWSWEEK (June 12, 2015, 1:12 PM),
http://bit.ly/1cYWBLX.
37 Wofford, supra note 36.
38 When this article discusses the value that the Internet provides to the economy, it
means the value created by Internet-related activities. The article does not define “Internetrelated activities,” but its use of this term refers generally to categories of activities developed by McKinsey in its reports on the economic impact of the Internet on the economy and
refer generally to (i) activities that use the World Wide Web as support (e.g., e-commerce,
online content, online advertising); (ii) communication using Internet Protocol; (iii) software
and service activities linked to the World Wide Web; and (iv) hardware manufacturers or
services that provide maintenance of Web-specific tools (e.g., computers, smartphones,
other devices, Internet servers). See MATTHIEU PÉLISSIÉ DU RAUSAS ET AL., MCKINSEY
GLOBAL INST., INTERNET MATTERS: THE NET’S SWEEPING IMPACT ON GROWTH, JOBS AND
PROSPERITY 7, 10 (2011), http://bit.ly/1XGLdGK.
39 Id. at 19.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 16.
42 JAMES MANYIKA & CHARLES ROXURGH, MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., THE GREAT
TRANSFORMER: THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNET ON ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PROSPERITY 1
(2011), http://bit.ly/1T7D2oe.
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thirds of all businesses have a web presence in developed markets, and over a
recent five-year period, the Internet accounted for 21% of GDP growth in
countries that represent more than 70% of global GDP and 15% GDP growth
over the same time period in the United States. 43 The Internet creates a 10%
increase in productivity for small- and medium-sized businesses (“SMEs”),
and SMEs that heavily utilize Internet-related technologies export twice as
much as competitors who do not. 44
At the individual level, the Internet adds to consumer surplus. Economists
define “consumer surplus” as the monetary gain that consumers obtain as a
result of purchasing a product at a lower price than the highest price that he
would be willing to pay. 45 In 2009, France received $10 billion in consumer
surplus through the Internet and the United States received $64 billion. 46
Viewed another way, the Internet created between $18 to $28 per month in
added value per user in Germany and the United Kingdom respectively. 47 Even
when the Internet disrupts older industries, the Internet creates 2.4 jobs for every job that is eliminated through such disruption. 48 In fact, the Internet economy comprises a significant portion of the global economy as a whole. From
2006 to 2011, the Internet in mature economies accounted for 21% of the GDP
growth, with traditional industries capturing around 75% of the benefits. 49
From 2007 to 2012, Internet-related industries increased the nominal value
added to the U.S. economy by approximately 110.4%. 50 Just two years ago, in
2014, Internet industries were estimated to be responsible for 6% of real U.S.
GDP—over $966 billion, and the Internet sector continues to grow. 51 Internet
industries comprise the sector of the economy that has generated the larger
increases in nominal value added to the economy than many traditional industries including chemical products, accommodation and food services, and finance and insurance. 52
Today, over 3.3 billion people use the Internet. 53 In the U.S. alone, since
2006, the number of Internet users has risen by approximately 100 million, and

PÉLISSIÉ DU RAUSAS ET AL., supra note 38, at 16.
Id. at 17.
45 Mansur
G. Abdullah et al., Consumer surplus, ENCYC. BRITANNICA,
http://bit.ly/1VPmfnx (last visited Feb. 7, 2016).
46 MANYIKA & ROXURGH, supra note 42, at 5 exh.4.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 4.
49 PÉLISSIÉ DU RAUSAS ET AL., supra note 38, at 16, 22.
50 STEPHEN E. SIWEK, INTERNET ASS’N, MEASURING THE U.S. INTERNET SECTOR 48 tbl.F1 (2015), http://bit.ly/20VFHQV.
51 Id. at 52 tbl.F-11.
52 Id. at 5.
53 Internet Users, supra note 23.
43
44
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user penetration of the Internet has reached 92%. 54 Now, the Internet is used in
every country, in every sector, and by most businesses. 55 Consumption and
expenditure that may be attributed to the Internet are higher than the agriculture or energy sectors. 56 If Internet consumption and expenditure were a sector,
its total contribution to GDP would be bigger than Spain’s or Canada’s GDPs
and is growing faster than Brazil’s economy. 57 Additionally, more than three
quarters of the value created by the Internet accrues to traditional industries. 58
In 2012, U.S. manufacturers exported $86.5 billion in products and services
ordered on-line, and during the same year, they only imported $50.7 billion in
goods and services on-line the same year. 59 In other words, there is a $36 billion “digital trade surplus” that the U.S. could expand across a range of trade
agreements. This could benefit not only technology companies and manufacturers, but also companies and workers in every sector of the economy, and
consumers across the globe. 60
II. THE LAWS THAT MAKE THE INTERNET WORK
Internet companies born in the United States dominate their worldwide
competitors. 61 This control of the market is largely due to the fact that America
invented the Internet. 62 Today, however, the Internet has become a decidedly
global product and platform. So what explains the continued worldwide dominance of U.S.-born Internet companies? The answer in no small part is the fact
that the United States, the incubator of those dominant firms, has the most Internet-friendly legal system in the world. 63 A friendlier incubator, in terms of
the legal environment, quite naturally results in a healthier and stronger firm
SIWEK, supra note 50, at 10.
PÉLISSIÉ DU RAUSAS ET AL., supra note 38, at 9-10.
56 Id. at 14 exh.3; see also BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
GROSS-DOMESTIC-PRODUCT-(GDP)-BY-INDUSTRY DATA-VALUE ADDED (2016) [hereinafter
VALUE ADDED GDP DATA], http://1.usa.gov/1Ld3eek (showing that agriculture and energy
sectors accounted for 1.4% and 1.6% of value added to GDP in 2013 respectively).
57 PÉLISSIÉ DU RAUSAS ET AL., supra note 38, at 14.
58 Robert W. Holleyman II, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, Digital Economy and
Trade: A 21st Century Leadership Imperative, Address Before the New Democratic Network (May 1, 2015) [hereinafter Holleyman NDN Address], http://1.usa.gov/1FoOvJY.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 The Invention of the Internet, HIST. CHANNEL, http://bit.ly/NcHeDF (last visited Feb.
7, 2016); see also Matt Krantz, 5 Companies Grab 70% of Your Online Dollars, USA TODAY (Nov. 5, 2015, 2:52 PM), http://usat.ly/1Ld3TfI.
63 INTERNET ASS’N, THE INTERNET IS A CRITICAL STAKEHOLDER IN TRADE (2013),
http://bit.ly/1SV0eWo.
54
55
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relative to those firms born in less accommodating environments.
The open, innovation-without-permission Internet ecosystem enjoyed in the
United States was not the teleological result of its conception or of any immutable characteristics of its technology. The Internet’s architecture was the result
of specific policy decisions to design an open platform free of centralized control. 64 Just as easily, the Internet could have been designed as a closed system,
controlled by a ruling oligarchy of firms. Dr. Vint Cerf, who has been described as the “Father of the Internet,” 65 discussed this policy choice in a congressional testimony:
The Internet’s open, neutral architecture has proven to be an enormous engine for
market innovation, economic growth, social discourse, and the free flow of ideas. The
remarkable success of the Internet can be traced to a few simple network principles—
end-to-end design, layered architecture, and open standards—which together give
consumers choice and control over their online activities. This “neutral” network has
supported an explosion of innovation at the edges of the network, and the growth of
companies like Google, Yahoo, eBay, Amazon, and many others. Because the network is neutral, the creators of new Internet content and services need not seek permission from carriers or pay special fees to be seen online. As a result, we have seen
an array of unpredictable new offerings—from Voice-over-IP to wireless home networks to blogging—that might never have evolved had central control of the network
been required by design. 66

Dr. Cerf’s testimony was given in the context of a debate over Congress’
consideration of network neutrality legislation. 67 He testified that broadband
Internet access providers, which had the technical means of manipulating the
end-to-end connections among users of the Internet, could change the design
characteristics of the open Internet. 68
Beyond the scope of his testimony, however, Dr. Cerf took for granted the
patchwork of laws that enabled his design choices to be fully realized. This
legal quilt is comprised of four laws.
 First Amendment to the United States Constitution 69
 Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976 (codification of the doctrine of “fair use”) 70
 Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 71
 Digital Millennium Copyright Act 72
64 Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 109th
Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Net Neutrality Hearings], http://1.usa.gov/1FRNo3M (prepared
statement of Vinton G. Cerf, Vice President & Chief Internet Evangelist, Google Inc.).
65 Grant A. Yang, Can-Spam: A First Step to No-Spam, 4 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1,
44 (2004).
66 Net Neutrality Hearings, supra note 64.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 U.S. CONST. amend I.
70 Copyright Act of 1976 § 107, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
71 Communications Decency Act of 1996 § 230, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
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These four critical and uniquely American laws serve as the cornerstones to
the legal foundation that supports the open, innovation-without-permission
Internet. Obviously, the first two laws were conceived prior to anyone’s contemplation of the Internet. The First Amendment was adopted on December
15, 1791, as part of the Bill of Rights. 73 The legal concept of fair use was codified in the Copyright Act on October 19, 1976 and went into effect January 1,
1978. 74 Congress adopted the second batch of laws at the dawn of the commercial Internet in a two-year period of perhaps unprecedented congressional prescience. These laws represent the recognition that the success of the Internet
would not occur without government intervention.
This article will next briefly describe the role played by each of these four
laws relative to the Internet. Each law’s influence on the Internet could be—
and has been—the subject of its own article. Consequently, this article is meant
only to provide a summary of how the law interacts with the Internet.
A. First Amendment
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. 75
The first case to analyze the First Amendment’s broad application to the Internet was Reno v. ACLU. 76 In this critically important case, the Supreme Court
ruled that certain provisions of the Communications Decency Act violated the
First Amendment because of its provisions amounted to a content-based blanket restriction of free speech. 77 In its opinion, the Court noted and affirmed the
trial court’s finding that “content on the Internet is as diverse as human
thought.” 78 The Court, in applying strict scrutiny to the restrictions, concluded
that there was “no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny
that should be applied to this medium.” 79 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, said, “[t]hrough the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can
become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any
72 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct.
28, 1999) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201-1205, 1301-32; 28 U.S.C. § 4001).
73 See S. DOC. NO. 112-9, at 25 n.2 (2012).
74 Copyright Act § 107.
75 U.S. CONST. amend I.
76 Reno v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union et al., 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
77 Id. at 868.
78 Id. at 852 (internal citations omitted).
79 Id. at 870
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soapbox.” 80
At the time this case was being litigated in 1997, Internet companies had approximately 12 million individual subscribers. 81 There were about 100,000 new
messages posted daily in newsgroups. 82 “Tens of thousands” of users engaged
in conversations on a huge range of subjects. 83 No doubt these facts influenced
the Court’s determination that the Internet should be protected from laws that
would chill speech or deny access to speech that was flourishing on this new
medium. 84 Given the medium’s nascence, these statistics were cited with some
degree of awe. Consider, today, how much more compelling are the statistics
from just two companies on the Internet: Facebook has over 1.5 billion active
users and Twitter facilitates more than 500 million new tweets every day. 85
First Amendment jurisprudence also protects anonymous speech, 86 which allows for robust discourse without fear of retaliation or embarrassment. 87 This
not only facilitates political speech, it facilitates user comments that can help
others decide whether to buy a product, see a movie, or eat at a restaurant. This
broad application of the First Amendment to the medium of the Internet (as
contrasted with other mass media such as broadcast radio, broadcast television,
and cable television) contributed to the invention of more recent groundbreaking companies such as Facebook, Twitter, and Yelp. 88
The First Amendment also helps the Internet by ensuring limitations to
overbroad application of exclusivity rights given creators under copyright law.
Courts have in a number of cases said that the fair use doctrine is a safety valve
that protects certain applications of exclusive rights from arguments that such
rights violate the First Amendment. 89
Finally, the First Amendment compels a limitation on the interpretation of
the Copyright Clause to the creative expression of an author and not to facts. In
Feist, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution mandates originality—”a
modicum of creativity”—as a prerequisite for copyright protection. 90 While it
is possible to arrange facts in a way that renders the composition a new work
of authorship, the decision recognizes that copyright law should give the public
Id.
Id. at 850-51.
82 Reno, 521 U.S. at 851.
83 Id. at 852.
84 See id. at 871-72.
85 Live, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://bit.ly/1cWKuda (last visited Sept. 14, 2015).
86 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341 (1995).
87 Id. at 341-42.
88 See Brief of Automattic, Inc. et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 25-26,
Yelp, Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc., 770 S.E.2d 440 (Va. 2015) (No. 140242).
89 See e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); Harper & Row Publs., Inc., v. Nation Enters. et al., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
90 Feist Pub’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
80
81
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flexibility to use, share, analyze, arrange, and redistribute facts, news, and information without fear of liability.
The Feist decision has a very real, practical effect on the Internet and the information economy. One need only think of how often, every day, the Internet
is used to investigate facts and how this adds value to our lives. For example,
the vast resources available on the Internet have made it much easier to quickly
verify facts and has increased the integrity of news journalism. 91 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission warns would-be investors to “arm yourself
with information,” 92 and most consumers use the Internet for research before
making purchases. 93
Perhaps because Europe does not have an equivalent to the First Amendment, the European Commission’s reaction to the Feist decision was to enact
the Database Directive. 94 The Database Directive—adopted in February
1996—created a “sui generis” right for database creators to protect their databases regardless of whether it qualifies for copyright protection for a period of
fifteen years. 95 Whether the Directive had an actual impact on potential start-up
activity in Europe is not known. 96 At least one study, however, notes that the
Directive has not meaningfully benefited the stakeholders that the Directive
was meant to protect—the publishing industry. 97
Consider also that a lack of First Amendment protections, where countries
regulate speech, has caused in some instances the total ban on an Internet company’s services. For instance, countries like Russia and Turkey have taken
91 Glenn Kessler, The Global Boom in Political Fact Checking, WASH. POST (June 13,
2014), http://wapo.st/1pTfJ05 (“[S]ince 2010, scores of fact-checking Web sites have
sprung up across the world.”).
92 Microcap Stock: A Guide for Investors, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N (Sept. 18,
2013), http://1.usa.gov/1LGSOhY.
93 JOHN B. HORRIGAN, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJ., THE INTERNET AND CONSUMER
CHOICE 28, 32-33 (2008), http://pewrsr.ch/1oI0Baz.
94 Council Directive 96/9/EC, 1996 O.J. (L 77/20) (EU).
95 Id. art. 7.
96 JOSEFA MONTEAGUDO ET AL., EUROPEAN COMM’N, ECON. PAPERS 456, THE ECONOMIC
IMPACT OF THE SERVICES DIRECTIVE: A FIRST ASSESSMENT FOLLOWING IMPLEMENTATION 52
(2012), http://bit.ly/ecp456en.
97 See Comm’n of the European Cmtys., First evaluation of Directive 96/EC on the legal
protection of databases 24-25 (Dec. 12, 2005) (DG Internal Market and Services Working
Paper), http://bit.ly/WP1st96EC (finding that although the Directive was aimed to create a
level-playing field between U.S. and European database industries, “the European share
decreased from 33% to 24% [between 2002 and 2004] while the US share increased from
62% to 72%. The ratio of European/US database production, which was nearly 1:2 in 1996,
has become 1:3 in 2004”); see also Peter K. Yu, The Political Economy of Data Protection,
84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 777, 799 (2009) (“The [Commission] report found that the Directive
not only failed to benefit the European Community much, but also might have harmed the
European publishing and database industries.”); James Boyle, Two Database Cheers for the
EU, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2006, 5:31 PM), http://on.ft.com/1QeDFqb.
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steps toward restricting free speech online. Russia signed a new law requiring
popular online personalities to register with the government, which would enable the government to more easily track them online. 98 In 2014, Turkey infamously blocked the social-media platform, Twitter, ahead of its elections in
order to prevent users from sharing information about alleged government corruption. 99
In the United States, the government largely has refrained from attempting
to impose speech restrictions on the Internet. 100 The U.S. government’s general
hands-off approach to speech on the Internet facilitates investment in, and use
of, interactive Internet sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and countless others. 101
B. Section 107 of the Copyright Act (Fair Use Doctrine)
Copyright law in the United States is centered on strong, exclusive rights for
authors. Specifically, Section 106 of the Copyright Act gives authors five exclusive rights:
 the right to reproduce a work
 the right to create derivative works of the original work
 the right to distribute copies of the work to the public
 the right to display the work publicly, and
 the right to perform the work publicly. 102
These exclusive rights are balanced by Section 107 of the Copyright Act. 103
Section 107 permits certain uses of the copyrighted work notwithstanding the
author’s exclusive rights in it, and explicitly allows its use for criticism, news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research purposes in qualified circumstances. 104 In addition to these specific uses, Section 107 provides four factors to be
considered in determining whether a use qualifies as a fair use:
 the purpose and character of the use (e.g., transformative or reproductive);
 the nature of the copyrighted work (e.g., the degree of creativity);
 the amount and substantiality of the portion of the original work
used; and
98 Neil MacFarquhar, Russia Tightens Reins on Web With ‘Bloggers Law’, N.Y. TIMES
(May 6, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1slgNL3.
99 Turkey: Pre-election Twitter Shutdown Brings Internet Freedom to New Low, AMNESTY INT’L (Mar. 12, 2014), http://bit.ly/21sBrup.
100 See, e.g., Reno, 521 U.S. at 844.
101 Brief of Automattic, Inc. et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 25-26, Yelp,
Inc., 770 S.E.2d 440 (No. 140242).
102 Copyright Act § 106.
103 Id. § 107.
104 Id.
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the effect of the use upon the market (or potential market) for the
original work. 105
In the past, fair use was a regime most vocally supported by consumers, libraries, and academics. 106 Quite naturally, corporate America—to the extent it
cared about copyright law—was more concerned about Section 106 and the
exclusive rights afforded authors. 107
The Internet economy has created a new voice in corporate America. These
voices are made up of companies that benefit more from the exceptions to copyright protection than from the exclusive rights. 108 For the first time in U.S.
history, there is an increasingly vocal corporate voice advocating for ensuring
that U.S. copyright law remains balanced—supporting both the strong protections for authors but ensuring equally strong limitations as well as exceptions. 109
Moreover, the Internet industry has been able to document its tangible, economic contribution to the U.S. economy. For example, in 2007, fair use industries generated total revenue averaging $4.7 trillion, representing a 36% increase from 2002. 110 In that same year, these industries contributed on average
about $2.2 trillion in added value—just over 16% of total U.S. GDP. 111
As noted earlier, there is a constitutional dimension to fair use. Legal scholars have long recognized the tension between Article I, Section 8 of the U.S.
Constitution, which authorizes Congress to provide copyright protection to
authors, and the First Amendment, which prohibits Congress from passing legislation restricting speech. 112 Interested parties have exploited this tension in an


Id.
Fair Use: Its Effects on Consumers and Industry: Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H.R. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
109th Cong. 20 (2005) (prepared statement of Peter Jaszi, Professor, American University,
Washington College of Law).
107 Laura A. Heymann, A Tale of (At Least) Two Authors: Focusing Copyright Law on
Process Over Product, 34 J. CORP. L. 1009, 1012 (2009).
108 JODIE GRIFFIN, PUB. KNOWL., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF COPYRIGHT 9 (2012),
http://bit.ly/1WJclEg.
109 The Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act: Hearing on H.R. 107 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H.R. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 108th Cong. 18 (2004) (prepared statement of Lawrence Lessig, Professor,
Stanford Law School).
110 THOMAS ROGERS & ANDREW SZAMOSSZEGI, COMP. & COMMC’NS INDUS. ASS’N, FAIR
USE IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS OF INDUSTRIES RELYING ON FAIR USE
20 cht.1 (2011), http://bit.ly/1MIoZnp.
111 Id. at 21-22 cht.2.
112 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 with U.S. CONST. amend. I; see, e.g., Melville B.
Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and
Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1180 (1970) (“[V]iews of copyright and the first amendment, held ‘side by side,’ may, in fact, be contradictory.”); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and
105
106
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attempt to convince courts to declare various provisions of the Copyright Act
unconstitutional. 113
Why is the constitutional import of fair use significant? It is so because fair
use provides constitutional balances to the limiting effects of exclusive
rights. 114 In other words, fair use provides constitutional symmetry in U.S. copyright law, which provides a balanced, strong foundation to both the exclusive
rights of authors—established pursuant to the intellectual property clause of
the constitution—and the limitations and exceptions to those rights—
established pursuant to both the intellectual property clause (relative to the limited duration of such rights) and the first amendment (relative to the rights of
others to use authors’ works without consent notwithstanding the authors’ exclusive rights). 115 In sum, fair use is the constitutional safety valve that permits
the limited monopolies provided to authors. Fair use reconciles the Constitution’s intellectual property clause with the First Amendment.
None of the United States’ trading partners possesses the same constitutional
framework. In fact, only a handful of countries around the world have a similar
fair use statute. 116 In other parts of the world, legal systems incorporate specific
statutory limitations and exceptions created by regulators or legislatures. 117 The
reliance of an ex-ante regulatory or legislative approval system has obvious
the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 984 (1970) (“[C]opyright persists in its potential for conflict with the [F]irst [A]mendment.”).
113 See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 555-58 (stating that the Nation magazine argued, unsuccessfully, that First Amendment values required its publication of unpublished
manuscript excerpts to be considered a fair use, given the public import of the matter).
114 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 479
(1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The fair use doctrine must strike a balance between the
dual risks created by the copyright system: on the one hand, that depriving authors of their
monopoly will reduce their incentive to create, and, on the other, that granting authors a
complete monopoly will reduce the creative ability of others.”); Roy Export Co. Establishment of Vaduz, Liechtenstein v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 672 F.2d 1095, 1099 n.9
(2d.Cir. 1982) (“Fair use balances the public interest in the free flow of ideas and information with the copyright holder’s interest in exclusive proprietary control of his
work.”); Wainwright Secs., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1977)
(“Conflicts between interests protected by the first amendment and the copyright laws thus
far have been resolved by application of the fair use doctrine.”).
115 Compare Copyright Act § 106 with Copyright Act § 107; see also Harper & Row,
471 U.S. at 556 (“[C]opyright’s idea/expression dichotomy ‘strike[s] a definitional balance
between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of
facts while still protecting an author’s expression.’” (internal citation omitted)).
116 Countries including Israel, Singapore, Australia, and the United Kingdom have enacted exceptions to copyright protection for certain uses that resemble the fair use doctrine in
the U.S. See, e.g., Copyright Act, 2007 (as amended on July 28, 2011), 5768-2007, SH No.
2199 p. 34 (Isr.) (Section 19: Fair Use); Copyright Act (Cap 64, 2006 Rev Ed) s 38A (Singapore); Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 40-42 (Austl.); United Kingdom Copyright, Designs
and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 30 (Eng.) (Fair Dealing).
117 See, e.g., Copyright Act 1968, s 40-47H (Austl.).
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shortcomings when applied to the fast-moving pace of Internet technologies
and business models.
There are two key examples of activities permitted by fair use that are critical to the digital environment.
1. Fair Use and Search Engines
Perhaps the most high-profile Internet company benefiting from fair use is
Google. Early search engines were inefficient. 118 Yahoo’s search engine, for
example, involved human editors who organized websites on the World Wide
Web into categories, such as “finance,” “entertainment,” “movies,” “health,”
“style,” “politics,” and numerous other categories. 119 Search engine technology
became less reliant on human editors when they began dispatching software 120
that scanned a website’s metadata, which the website’s creators filled with key
words that described the contents of the website. 121 These early search engines
were totally reliant on websites’ creators to fill the sites’ metadata with accurate descriptions of the content of the sites. Not surprisingly, website creators
sometimes inaccurately described the website to manipulate search results.
Still, this system was much more efficient than its prior iteration that relied on
human editors.
Google significantly upgraded search technology by not just searching a
website’s metadata, but instead enabling its robots to copy the entire content of
the site. When a user enters a query into Google’s search box, the user is
searching not the Internet but rather a recently stored copy of the Internet that
resides on Google’s computers. Today, all major search engines “crawl” and
copy the World Wide Web and store such copy on their computers. 122 The storage of the contents of entire websites allows these search engines to create algorithms that can make the responses to a user’s search query much more relevant than prior search engine iterations that used only the descriptive terms in a
site’s metadata. 123 Relevant for our purposes, these search engines engage in
widespread, automatic copying of other people’s content without the authority
118 See Danny Sullivan, The Yahoo Directory – Once The Internet’s Most Important
Search Engine – Is To Close, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Sept. 26, 2014, 2:21 PM),
http://selnd.com/YkCGzR.
119 See Vangie Beal, Web Search Engines & Directories, WEBOPEDIA (June 19, 2009),
http://bit.ly/21sBvu1; see also Sullivan, supra note 118.
120 Curt
Franklin, How Internet Search Engines Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS,
http://bit.ly/1k8T25v (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.

2016]

Recalibrating U.S. Trade Policy

333

of the content creators. 124 Notwithstanding the content creator’s exclusive right
under the Copyright Act to limit the copying of her work, fair use allows
search engines to engage in such permission-less copying. 125
It is worth noting that while U.S. courts have upheld such permission-less
copying, this activity is not expressly permitted under Internet laws in the European Union. 126 Article 5(1) of the EU Copyright Directive establishes an exception for temporary and incidental copies that do not have economic significance, but a search engine’s ability to rely on this law has not been tested in the
European courts. 127 The EU E-Commerce Directive includes safe harbors for
mere-conduit, caching, and hosting functions, however, the exceptions do not
encompass information location tools (as search engines are known under the
DMCA, for example). 128
2. Fair Use and Cloud Computing
Faster broadband speeds, cheap storage costs, and ubiquitous, multi-device
connectivity to the Internet have shifted storage of content from a user’s personal computer to the “cloud.” 129 Cloud-based storage allows a user to keep
copies of her content in a remote location that gives her access to such content
anywhere she is connected to the Internet. 130 A user can download this content
to multiple devices at different times or stream audiovisual content using a
software-based audiovisual player. 131
The growth of the cloud-based ecosystem has been dramatic. Since 2014,
cloud-based traffic has grown from 3.5 to 5.6 zettabytes, and is projected to
triple to 10.4 zettabyes by 2019. 132 Mobile cloud apps made up 81% of mobile
124 See Field v. Google Inc., 412 F.Supp.2d 1106, 1121-22 (D.Nev. 2006); see also
Brendan Gibbons, Search Engines, Indexing and Copyright Law, PRACTICAL ECOMMERCE
(Dec. 14, 2009), http://bit.ly/1VF0KWC.
125 See Field, 412 F.Supp.2d at 1121-22; see also Gibbons, supra note 124.
126 Compare Field, 412 F.Supp.2d at 1123 with Directive 2001/29/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of
copyright and related rights in the information society, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L. 167) [hereinafter
Directive 2001/29/EC].
127 Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 126, art. 5, ¶ 1.
128 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000
on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce,
in the Internal Market, arts. 12-14, 2000 O.J. (L. 178) [hereinafter Directive 2000/31/EC].
129 Qusay F. Hassan, Demystifying Cloud Computing, CROSSTALK, Jan.–Feb. 2011, at
16, 17-18, http://bit.ly/1R2V2tP.
130 Johnathan
Strickland, How Cloud Computing Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS,
http://bit.ly/1je4wqN (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
131 Cloud AV, INFOCOMM INT’L (Nov. 1, 2010), http://bit.ly/1p6pahm.
132 CISCO, CISCO GLOBAL CLOUD INDEX: FORECAST & METHODOLOGY, 2014-2019, at 5-6
fig.1 (2015) [hereinafter CISCO GLOBAL CLOUD FORECAST], http://bit.ly/1BNhCTZ.
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data traffic in 2014. 133 Mobile cloud traffic is projected to grow eleven-fold
from 2014 to 2019. 134 In that time, over 80% of workloads will be processed by
cloud data centers, with cloud workload growth tripling compared to traditional data center workloads growing at a much slower rate. 135 The global market
for cloud services (or Infrastructure-as-a-Service, “IaaS”) is projected to grow
from $23 billion in 2015 to $34 billion in 2018. 136 Global spending on IaaS was
projected to reach $16.5 billion in 2015, an increase of over 30% from 2014. 137
The benefits of cloud-based storage are clear. In a recent article, The Economist described cloud computing as “a business-critical issue,” enabling organizations to avoid the problems associated with aging IT systems and “to better
position themselves to sell and compete on global platforms.” 138 It not only
provides portability, but it allows for more seamless upgrades and transitions
to new or multiple devices, because content does not need to be laboriously
copied from one device to another. In addition, taking advantage of economies
of scale, storage of data can be more secure than storage on local servers. 139
While a user practically and intuitively understands the benefits of cloud
storage, the importance of fair use to this fast-growing ecosystem, is less clear.
An understanding of fair use, however, quickly illuminates why it is fundamental to cloud computing. Put simply, fair use allows a user to copy and send
a copyrighted work, if done so for personal purposes or other limited uses,
without prior authorization of the copyright owner. 140 Imagine a world where a
user who stores her music library remotely would need to obtain consent from
each music file’s copyright owner prior to streaming a single song. Significantly, because of judicially developed theories of secondary liability, the cloud
computing service without fair use very well could determine it needed to disable copying and sharing features for third-party content. 141 Because copying is
unavoidable in the cloud ecosystem (i.e., copies of a work must be made to

133 Louis Columbus, Roundup of Cloud Computing Forecasts and Market Estimates Q3
Update, 2015, FORBES (Sept. 27, 2015, 6:48 PM), http://onforb.es/1VFMNI1.
134 Id.
135 CISCO GLOBAL CLOUD FORECAST, supra note 132, at 8 fig.3.
136 Allan Krans & Jillian Morandi, The Developers’ Coup: 2015 Development Demands
and Vendor Opportunities: Insights from TBR’s Cloud Platform and Developer Research 4
(2015) (unpublished presentation), http://bit.ly/1VzUByI.
137 Press Release, Gartner, Gartner Says Worldwide Cloud Infrastructure-as-a-Service
Spending to Grow 32.8 Percent in 2015 (May 18, 2015), http://gtnr.it/1R3F2tu.
138 Mapping the Cloud Maturity Curve, THE ECONOMIST (May 14, 2015),
http://bit.ly/1Q2juxG.
139 Id.
140 Copyright Act § 107.
141 See Marc Aaron Melzer, Copyright Enforcement in the Cloud, 21 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 403, 416 (2011)
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move or stream it), 142 cloud technologies without fair use would come to a
grinding halt.
Again, a cloud technology company operating in a jurisdiction lacking a fair
use principle must weigh the potential of litigation before innovating and
bringing a product or service to market. Without a flexible fair use standard,
technology companies in most jurisdictions must rely on a regulatory or legislative body to approve specific uses or technologies. In Europe, for example,
Article 5(2)(b) of the Copyright Directive allows for limited sharing of copyrighted works but only if the rights holders receive “fair compensation.” 143
Such compensation typically manifests itself through the form of a tax on the
products and services that facilitate copying. 144
C. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
The Internet as it exists today would not be possible without Section 230 of
the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”). 145 Section 230 generally protects
Internet companies from civil liability under federal and state law for content
provided by a third person. 146 Specifically, Section 230(c)(1) states:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher
or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider. 147

Therefore, a defendant would be immune from state law liability under the
Act if:
(1) [I]t is a “provider or user of an interactive computer service”; (2) the complaint
seeks to hold the defendant liable as a “publisher or speaker”; and (3) the action is
based on “information provided by another information content provider.” 148

Section 230 was adopted in response several cases, including Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co, in which the court treated the Internet company as a publisher of content developed by a third party user of the Internet
company’s platform. 149 At the time of the decision, Prodigy’s site received
60,000 postings a day—far too many to review in their entirety. 150 The court
imposed potential liability on Prodigy for all posts. 151
In Section 230, Congress created an important precedent in Internet policy
See id. at 406-07.
Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 126, art. 5, ¶ 2(b).
144 Id. Pmbl. ¶¶ 35-36, 38.
145 Communications Decency Act § 230.
146 Id. § 230(c)(2).
147 Id. § 230(c)(1).
148 Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2011).
149 See Stratton Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy Serv. Co., 1995 WL 323710 at *5 (S.C.N.Y.
1995), superseded by statute as stated in Shiamili, 952 N.E.2d at 1011.
150 Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710 at *3.
151 Id.
142
143
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that has endured for 20 years. Legislators decided to refrain from holding Internet companies liable for the conduct of third parties who use their platforms
in order to promote innovation by Internet companies and to ensure that the
Internet would continue to grow. 152 Congress recognized that the scale of the
Internet would make it impossible for Internet companies to police their platforms or pre-screen user activity and that the potential of such liability under
traditional concepts of publisher liability would create a perverse incentive for
an Internet company to avoid acquiring knowledge of potentially unlawful activity. By eliminating such liability, Congress chose instead to incentivize
companies to respond to notices of potentially unlawful or unsavory activity.
Section 230 provides four exceptions to its limitations on liability. 153 Section
230 does not provide immunity for violations of federal criminal law, limit or
expand intellectual property law, prevent consistent State law actions, or limit
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. 154 Courts have interpreted
Section 230 broadly. In the seminal case interpreting this provision, Zeran v.
Am. Online, Inc., 155 the court explained:
Faced with potential liability for each message republished by their services, interactive computer service providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type
of messages posted. Congress considered the weight of the speech interests implicated
and chose to immunize service providers to avoid any such restrictive effect. 156

The Court also recognized Section 230’s complimentary purpose: by immunizing service providers from liability based on content posted on their
sites, Section 230 also removes the incentive for providers not to edit their sites
for fear of potential liability as a “publisher.” 157 In that case, the court held that
AOL was “plainly immune. . . from liability for information that originates
with third parties that was posted on its site. 158 After Zeran established that
service providers are generally immune from liability under Section 230, other
courts followed, resounding support for the protections Section 230 provides.
In particular, courts recognize the scale of the Internet renders it impossible for
a service provider, particularly small companies or nascent services, to police
the Internet:
[S]creening, though lawful, is hard. Simple filters along the lines of “postings may not
contain the words ‘white’” can’t work. Statements such as “red brick house with white
trim” do not violate any law, and prospective buyers and renters would be worse off if
152 CDA 230: Legislative History, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., http://bit.ly/1SVViR4 (last
visited Feb. 7, 2016).
153 Communications Decency Act § 230(e).
154 Id.
155 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
156 Id. at 331.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 328.
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craigslist blocked descriptive statements. An online service could hire a staff to vet the
postings, but that would be expensive and may well be futile: if postings had to be reviewed before being put online, long delay could make the service much less useful,
and if the vetting came only after the material was online the buyers and sellers might
already have made their deals. Every month more than 30 million notices are posted
to the craigslist system . . . . It would be necessary to increase that staff (and the expense that users must bear) substantially to conduct the sort of editorial review that the
[plaintiff] demands—and even then errors would be frequent . . . Automated filters
and human reviewers may be equally poor at sifting good from bad postings unless
the discrimination is blatant; both false positives and false negatives are inevitable. 159

While courts have generally ruled in favor of ISP immunity, some courts
have also begun to question such blanket immunity in certain cases. 160 The
Ninth Circuit clarified that a service provider was not immune from liability
where a website operator developed the content selected by a user of the website’s platform. 161
There have been over 184 cases involving Section 230 since 1996. 162 A vast
majority of those cases have found that Internet companies are immune from
liability consistent with the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Zeran. 163 By now, nearly every single Circuit has considered Section 230, and interpreted it as providing broad protections for service providers, consistent with Zeran’s first interpretations. 164
159 Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civ. Rts. Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666,
668-69 (7th Cir. 2008), as amended (May 2, 2008).
160 See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The Communications Decency Act was not meant to create a
lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet.”)
161 See id. at 1165-66 (holding CDA did not immunize website for induced third parties
to express illegal preferences on its website by posting a questionnaire and displaying its
answers on its site).
162 David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 373, 448 tbl.8 (2010).
163 See, e.g., Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The
majority of federal circuits have interpreted the CDA to establish broad ‘federal immunity to
any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating
with a third-party user of the service.’” (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331)); Carafano v.
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2003). Courts have even extended
their reading of Section 230 to bar claims for injunctive relief against service providers. See
generally Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 983–86 (10th Cir.
2000) (holding that section 230 immunized a computer service provider from a suit for
damages and injunctive relief); see also generally Doe v. America Online Inc., 783 So.2d
1010, 1013-17 (Fla. 2001). “We specifically concur [with Zeran] that section 230 expressly
bars ‘any actions’ and we are compelled to give the language of this preemptive law its plain
meaning.” Id. at 1018.
164 All of the following cases held service operators qualified for immunity under Section 230. See, e.g., Universal Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 422 (1st
Cir. 2007); Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456¸781 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2015); DiMeo v.
Max, 248 Fed.Appx. 280, 282 (3rd Cir. 2007); Westlake Legal Grp. v. Yelp, Inc., 599
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In just one second online, Internet users send over 2.4 million emails, view
over 100,000 YouTube videos, and generate over 50,000 Google searches,
7,000 tweets, 1,100 Tumblr posts, and 700 Instagram photos. 165 It is clearly
impossible to monitor all activity online. Without the protections of Section
230, many if not most of these companies would not exist.
D. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) limits the remedies
available against online intermediaries based on the activities of their users. 166
President Clinton signed the DMCA into law in 1998 and contains five operable titles:
 Title I-WIPO Treaties Implementation
 Title II-Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation
 Title III-Computer Maintenance or Repair Copyright Exemption
 Title IV-Miscellaneous Provisions
 Title V-Protection of Certain Original Designs 167
Title I of the DMCA updates U.S. copyright law in order to comply with the
WIPO Copyright Treaty (“WCT”) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (“WPPT”), which was adopted at the WIPO Diplomatic Conference in December 1996 (“WIPO Treaty”). 168
Title II of the DMCA, the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, provides critical protection for Internet companies. 169 Specifically,
Title II provides online service providers with a safe harbor from liability for
copyright infringement, so long as the providers comply with certain obligations. 170 The safe harbor applies to Internet companies that host, link to, or provide access to content on the Internet and to four categories of conduct by these companies: transitory communications, system caching, storage of information on systems or networks at the direction of users, and information locaFed.Appx. 481, 485 (4th Cir. 2015); Doe v. MySpace, 528 F.3d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 2008);
Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 417 (6th Cir. 2014); Doe v.
GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003); Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 792 (8th
Cir. 2010); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008); Ezra & Co., 206 F.3d at
986; Almeida, 456 F.3d at 132; Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.2d 1354, 1357-59 (D.C. Cir.
2014).
165 In 1 Second, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://bit.ly/1Sj5QVX (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
166 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
167 Id.
168 Id. §§ 101-105.
169 Id. §§ 201-203.
170 Copyright Act § 512.
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tion tools. 171 A party must be a ‘service provider’ to qualify for a safe harbor. 172
The safe harbor for transitory communications requires the provider to be “an
entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital
online communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, without modification to the content of the material
as sent or received.” 173 The safe harbors for caching, user-directed storage, and
information location tools require only that a party be “a provider of online
services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor…” 174 To be
eligible for the safe harbor, the service provider must fulfill two other obligations: (1) adopt and reasonably implement a policy of terminating the accounts
of subscribers who are repeated infringers and (2) “accommodates and does
not interfere with standard technical measures.” 175 These ‘measures’ do not
impose an affirmative duty on service providers to monitor its site or seek information about copyright infringement on its service.
After meeting these baseline obligations, the service provider must comply
with the DMCA’s notice-and-take-down provisions. 176 These provisions affords copyright owners the opportunity to notify a service provider of allegedly
infringing material on the provider’s site or system, and requires the provider
to remove or block access to the infringing material. 177 The service provider
must designate an agent for receiving and processing notices from copyright
owners to the Copyright Office and on its service. 178 The agent must be clearly
designated to the Copyright Office and on its service. 179 The Act exempts providers from liability if a provider, in good faith, removes or blocks access to
material after receiving a notice of alleged infringement or after becoming
aware of infringing material. 180
The adoption of the DMCA’s safe harbors were critical to the growth of the
171 Id. “Information location tools” generally cover service provider referral to material
at other websites through a search engine, list of recommended sites, or a hypertext link. Id.
§ 512(d).
172 Id. § 512(a).
173 Id. § 512(k)(1)(A).
174 Id. § 512(k)(1)(B).
175 Id. § 512(i)(1)(A)-(B). Standard technical measures are defined as measures that copyright owners use “to identify or protect copyrighted works [that] (A) have been developed
pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair and
voluntary multi-industry process, (B) are available to anyone on reasonable nondiscriminatory terms; and (C) do not impose substantial costs or burdens on service providers.” Id. §
512(i)(2)(A)-(C). These may include digital watermarks or other technological means of
preventing copying of a work. See id.
176 Copyright Act § 512(j)(3).
177 Id. § 512(g)(2)(A).
178 Id. § 512(c)(2).
179 Id.
180 Id. § 512(g)(1). The material that is the subject of the notice must fall within one of
the four activities provided by the act. Id. § 512(g)(4).
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Internet. Copyright is a strict liability regime with a unique statutory damages
component and a judicially developed secondary liability construction. 181 Absent safe harbors that limit liability for service providers, this framework
would result in astronomical claims for statutory damages against Internet
companies for performing the very functions that enable the Internet to exist.
The combination of copyright’s strict liability provisions and the massive
scale of the Internet have the potential to significantly chill innovation, information sharing, and the development of the Internet. Today, there are well over
1 billion websites online, and over three billion people in the world using the
Internet—and potentially posting, sharing, or creating content or software that
violates copyright law. 182 It is impossible for an Internet company to proactively “police the Internet” for infringing activity on its platform. 183 That is, it is
difficult - if not impossible - for a third party to know in most instances whether any particular distribution of a work is infringing, whether the distribution is
a fair use, whether the sender has a license, or even who owns the copyright.
Crucially, the DMCA adopted the policy decision made by Congress in Section 230, which is that Internet companies should not be required to police the
Internet or be liable for third party actions. 184 Unlike Section 230, the DMCA
requires Internet companies to respond to notices from rights holders of potentially infringing activity. 185
The notice-and-take down procedure strikes the right balance by providing a
way for rights holders to protect their works and a reasonable way for Internet
companies to assist rights holders in doing so. 186 The provision places responsibility for resolving disputes on the owner of the work, and the person who
displayed, posted, or sent it without the owner’s permission. 187 The DMCA
immunizes Internet companies if they promptly remove potentially infringing
181 See generally Kent Sinclair Jr., Liability for Copyright Infringement – Handling Innocence in a Strict Liability Context, 58 CAL. L. REV. 940, 941-61 (1970).
182 Total Number of Websites, supra note 26.
183 See generally Jonathan Schulman, Liability of Internet Service Providers for Infringing Activities of their Customers: Will the Induce Act Solve the Problem?, 13 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 121, 121 (2005) (“To address the growing concern of copyright infringement, the courts have decided several landmark cases in the past twenty years; however, no
Congressional law or decision by the courts has stopped the illegal distribution of copyrighted materials.”).
184 Communications Decency Act § 230(a).
185 Copyright Act § 512(c)(1).
186 If the subscriber serves a counter notification complying with statutory requirements,
including a statement under penalty of perjury that the material was removed or disabled
through mistake or misidentification, then the Internet company must put the material back
up within 10-14 business days after receiving the counter notification, unless the copyright
owner files an action seeking a court order against the subscriber. Id. § 512(c)(3).
187 Id. § 512.
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works after receiving a takedown notice. 188 The Internet companies would also
have to promptly notify the subscriber once the material has been removed or
access disabled. 189 In which case, if there is a dispute, the Internet company is
not in the middle of it—the owner of the work may file an action against the
subscriber who posted the material, and the subscriber may seek a penalty
against the owner for knowing material misrepresentations in the notice to the
Internet company. 190 Again, Congress declined to make the Internet company
the arbiter of what is or is not lawful activity in the ether.
The bottom line is that the DMCA provides Internet companies, and the
venture capitalists that fund start-ups, with all-important certainty that as long
as they comply with fairly simple obligations, they can operate without fear of
litigation. The obligations do not require any great degree of internal legal sophistication, allowing a start-up to launch without the need for in-house lawyers. 191 But even the smallest start-up knows that it must put in place a process
to comply with DMCA obligations. It is impossible to overstate the DMCA
safe harbor’s importance to the Internet. Former YouTube General Counsel
Zahavah Levine stated, “[w]ithout this safe harbor, sites like YouTube could
not exist.” 192
III. U.S. TRADE POLICY NEEDS TO BE UPDATED TO REFLECT
TODAY’S INTERNET ECONOMY
In today’s globally-oriented competitive business landscape, U.S. trade policy does not fully export the laws that make it possible for U.S. Internet companies to succeed abroad. Rather, trade policy still largely reflects the priorities
of a pre-Internet era. Of the few laws that make the Internet work, USTR has
only successfully incorporated the safe harbors of the DMCA into trade
agreements. 193 USTR incorporated a fair use-like provision into trade negotiations only three years ago, and this provision has been included in the proposed
TPP—which awaits ratification by the Senate. 194 Section 230 and First
Amendment-like protections have yet to become trade objectives. The failure
to incorporate half of the legal framework (and if the TPP is not adopted, threeId. § 512(c).
Id. § 512(g)(1).
190 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT 12 (1998),
http://bit.ly/DMCApdf.
191 See generally id.
192 David Kravetz, 10 Years Later, Misunderstood DMCA is the Law That Saved the
Web, WIRED (Oct. 27, 2008, 3:01 PM), http://bit.ly/1rgxInf.
193 CABINET SECRETARIAT OF JAPAN, TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT SUMMARY 10 (2015) http://bit.ly/1XHm7Yq.
194 Margot E. Kaminski, The Capture of International Intellectual Property Law
Through the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 977, 1027-28 (2014).
188
189
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quarters of the framework) that makes the Internet work impairs U.S. companies’ global competitiveness. 195
The primary trade authorities in the U.S. lack sufficient high-ranking officials and inter-agency groups dedicated to promoting the Internet and access to
information access policy. 196 The administration has some trade-focused offices—such as the International Trade Administration (“ITA”)—that seem to address telecommunications and information technologies, however, these entities are not primarily focused on the four basic laws that make the Internet
work. 197 For instance, the Department of Commerce’s ITA divisions on ecommerce, information, and telecommunications do not report on intermediary
liability, information access barriers, or many of the key priorities of today’s
Internet industry. 198 The latest available e-commerce “tool kit” and telecommunications statistics reports on the division’s site are from 2011. 199 And while
Congress oversees trade, it has not focused on prioritizing the interests of Internet companies.
Not surprisingly, the administration’s institutional priority relative to promoting the Internet is reflected in USTR’s current trade priorities and in the
recently negotiated trade agreements themselves. When trade agreements do
discuss the Internet, it is most often mentioned in the context of promoting
strong intellectual property (“IP”) enforcement related to pirated software,

195 The international nature of the Internet renders companies vulnerable to liability in
markets that have not recognized the benefits of a balanced IP regime for online content.
Several jurisdictions have declined to adopt liability limitations for online service providers
similar to those available in the U.S. For example, France, Italy, and Germany have imposed fines or harsh requirements on websites for allowing access to certain information or
content. See Ruling on Nazi Memorabilia Sparks Legal Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24,
2000), http://nyti.ms/1NkGiL9; Landgericht Hamburg (LG), Sept. 26, 2008, 308 O 42/06,
http://bit.ly/308O4206; Giulio Coraggio, Yahoo! Liable for Searchable Contents!, IPT ITALY (May 28, 2011), http://bit.ly/1XHmd28.
196 Cf. Cameron Kerry & Christopher Schroeder, White House Council Launches Interagency Subcommittee on Privacy & Internet Policy (Oct. 24, 2010, 10:10 PM),
http://1.usa.gov/23IELWH (discussing one interagency subcommittee created in 2010 to
promote the Internet and information access).
197 See About the International Trade Administration, INT’L TRADE ADMIN.,
http://1.usa.gov/1Sj6frg (last visited Apr. 12, 2016) (“The International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, manages this global trade site to provide access to ITA
information on promoting trade investment, strengthening the competitiveness of U.S. industry, and ensuring fair trade and compliance with trade laws and agreements.”).
198 See Research by Industry/Sector: Internet and E-commerce Technologies, OFFICE OF
TECH. & ELEC. COMMERCE, http://1.usa.gov/1ruSAqQ (last visited Apr. 12, 2016).
199 See generally Telecommunications Equipment Trade Statistics, OFFICE OF TECH. &
ELEC. COMMERCE, http://1.usa.gov/1qD0tJH (last updated Sept. 18, 2012); see also generally KEN WALSH, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, PREPARING YOUR BUSINESS FOR GLOBAL E-COMMERCE
1 (2011), http://1.usa.gov/1rqwXrD.
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trademark infringement, and cybersecurity. 200 While these are important priorities, they say nothing of the need to promote access to and use of the nearlimitless resources the Internet provides. In May 2015, USTR Robert Holleyman II laudably promoted policies “to ensure the Internet remains open, free,
and a platform for global innovation,” but USTR advocacy did not address
these objectives before this moment. 201 This was the first time we are aware of
a trade official making such a case.
Consequently, we propose that Congress create trade ambassadors for the
Internet and for access to information. Congress and the administration should
create trade offices that promote the Internet and the laws that make it work.
And, USTR should create additional Industry Trade Advisory Committees
(“ITACs”) to support the Internet and access to information. The current
asymmetry in U.S. trade policy will only persist if the organizational structure
in the U.S. continue to focus on outdated issues unless structural changes of
this kind are made.
A. History of Copyright in U.S. Trade Agreements
With its passage of the DMCA in 1998, the U.S. took a vital step toward
opening new revenue streams and markets by providing certain rules of the
road for the Internet. 202 The DMCA has been critical law for Internet companies and has exemplified the benefits of incorporating exceptions and limitations to balance strong IP protections. 203
Only over the last twenty years or so has the U.S. used trade agreements to
advance interests beyond pure import and export goals. Beginning with its accession to the Berne Convention in 1988, the U.S. began to recognize the importance of IP protections in trade policy. 204 But U.S. adherence to the Berne
convention was only a small step forward. Berne was not self-executing under
U.S. law, meaning that domestic copyright principles were not exported, and
200 See, e.g., United States–Australia Free Trade Agreement art. 17.3, ¶ 1, U.S.-Austl.,
Jan. 1, 2005 [hereinafter Australia FTA], http://bit.ly/AUSFTA (requiring trademark dispute
settlement procedure for domain names); United States–Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement art. 16.4, ¶ 1, U.S.-Col., May 15, 2012 [hereinafter Colombia TPA],
http://bit.ly/ColTPA (requiring trademark dispute settlement procedure for domain names).
201 See Holleyman NDN Address, supra note 58.
202 LILIAN EDWARDS, ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES IN THE
FIELD OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 12-14 (2010), http://bit.ly/23W94JN.
203 Priyambada Mishra & Angsuman Dutta, Striking a Balance between Liability of Internet Service Providers and Protection of Copyright over the Internet: A Need of the Hour,
14 J. INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS 321, 326 (2009).
204 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, as last revised July 24, 1971, amended Oct. 2, 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 828
U.N.T.S. 221, 102 Stat. 2853 (1979).
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copyright disputes would be resolved under domestic law. 205 Shortly after, the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
was signed in Morocco in 1994, and it aimed to promote uniformity in the way
IP rights are protected around the world. 206 It established minimum levels of
protection that each government must give to fellow World Trade Organization
(“WTO”) members. 207 The creation of the WTO at the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in 1995 and the passage of the TRIPS agreement
secured the link between copyright principles and trade negotiations. 208 In addition, mandating ratification of TRIPS established the priority of legal parity on
IP principles among nations. 209 These two events helped the framework for
exporting the IP principles of the U.S. overseas. 210
The United States has been vigorous in its promotion of strong IP protections through trade. 211 However, the U.S. has exported an asymmetrical copyright regime that does not fully reflect the balance found in U.S. law. By focusing only on enforcement, protection, and prevention of illegitimate uses, Congress has given an excuse for other countries to engage in protectionist prosecutions against U.S. Internet companies for activity that is legal under U.S.
law. 212
Over the past decade or so, USTR has made small, but important, steps toward promoting more Internet-friendly priorities, including IP policies that
provide the flexibility necessary for a balanced regime. In addition to the
DMCA, the USTR recently promoted fair use-like language in the TPP negotiId.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (“Desiring to reduce
distortions and impediments to international trade, and taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that
measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become
barriers to legitimate trade…”).
207 Id. art. 4.
208 See e.g., Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 205, arts.
9-15, 69.
209 Clarisa Long, TRIPs and Intellectual Property Protection in Emerging Markets, 1
INTELL. PROP. PRAC. GROUP. NEWSL., Fall 1997, http://bit.ly/1NzSZws.
210 See Andrew Christie, Sophie Waller, & Kimerlee Weatherall, Exporting the DMCA
Through Free Trade Agreements, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
211, 211 (Christopher Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2007); WORLD TRADE
ORG., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION…IN BRIEF 6 (2014).
211 Peter Drahos, Global Property Rights in Information: The Story of TRIPS at the
GATT, 13 PROMETHEUS 6, 7-8 (1995).
212 Anne Hiaring, What’s New in the Neighborhood - The Export of the DMCA in PostTRIPS FTAs, 11 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 171, 172 (2005).
205
206
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ations. 213
The DMCA was first added to the template for U.S. free trade agreements in
2003. 214 DMCA-like provisions were included in the Chile FTA. 215 These provisions allowed Chile to choose how to implement the relevant ban in its copyright liability regime, and apply to a slightly narrower category of uses. 216
Around the same time, the U.S. concluded FTAs with Singapore and Australia,
that included provisions more closely resembling the DMCA. 217 The incorporation of DMCA principles provides an important protection for Internet companies; it was a significant first step toward amending trade policies to promote a
more balanced system that accounted for not only the interests of rights holders, but of Internet companies and user communities. By negotiating FTAs
with IP chapters containing DMCA provisions, the U.S. has provided increased
assurance to Internet companies that their business in foreign countries will be
protected. 218 Internet companies are prone to liability risks as they enter new
markets and place servers and personnel in new jurisdictions. 219
The United States began exporting the DMCA through trade agreements in
2003. 220 Between 2003 and 2007, the U.S. concluded free trade agreements
with 16 countries. 221 Over that time, there has been a marked increase in the
length, and technical detail, of chapters focused on IP compared to earlier trade
agreements. 222 The anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA have received
a particularly increased amount of attention in recent years. 223
213 USTR Introduces New Copyright Exceptions and Limitations Provision at San Diego
TPP Talks, TRADEWINDS. (July 3, 2012) [hereinafter USTR Introduces New Exceptions],
http://1.usa.gov/1NkGkCP.
214 Hiaring, supra note 212, at 174; United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement art.
16.4, ¶ 7, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003 [hereinafter Singapore FTA], http://bit.ly/SingFTA.
215 See United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement art. 17.7, ¶ 5, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003
[hereinafter Chile FTA], http://bit.ly/ChileFTA.
216 See id. art. 17.7, ¶ 5.
217 See Singapore FTA, supra note 214, art. 16.4, ¶ 7; Australia FTA, supra note 200, art.
17.4, ¶ 7.
218 OFFICE
OF U.S. TRADE REP., 2004 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 5 (2004),
http://bit.ly/04SP301.
219 ALI STERNBURG & MATT SCHRUERS, COMP. & COMMC’N INDUS. ASS’N, MODERNIZING
LIABILITY RULES TO PROMOTE INTERNET TRADE 5 (2014) (“Internet companies are being
forced to choose between forsaking foreign markets completely, thereby denying local users
the benefits of Internet services and Internet-enabled commerce; or abandoning legal, innovative, and profitable practices due to pervasive legal uncertainty.”).
220 Christie, Waller & Weatherall, supra note 210, at 215; see supra notes 214-217.
221 See id. at 212 n.4.
222 Id. at 213-14.
223 See, e.g., Parker Higgins, EFF to Congress: Get Rid of DMCA’s “AntiCircumvention”
Provisions,
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.
(Sept.
17,
2014),
http://bit.ly/1VCb4BH (“In recent years, concerns about the anti-circumvention provisions
have hit the mainstream, as cell phone users realized that something as simple as unlocking
their device to use a rival carrier could get them threatened with a crime.”).
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IP chapters in trade agreements have increased in detail and complexity over
the years as countries have tailored the broader treaty language to embody their
stance on IP—usually in the direction of stricter enforcement regimes. 225 Generally, the U.S. has been successful in exporting the DMCA almost verbatim as
the way that WTO member countries implement the anti-circumvention provisions required by the WIPO copyright treaty. 226 The tendency for countries to
add provisions that more strictly and specifically limit certain uses or technologies is indicative of the asymmetry in U.S. trade policy, and it shows the need
for the U.S. to strengthen its export of Internet-friendly laws.
Introducing fair use-like language is an important development for Internet
companies. The U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, (“KORUS”) completed
and enacted in 2012, for the first time referenced fair use in a trade agreement. 227 It authorizes parties to provide exceptions and limitations to copyright
protections—the provisions resembling fair use principles to be adopted in a
trade agreement. 228 KORUS provides in text:
Each Party shall provide that authors, performers, and producers of phonograms have
the right to authorize or prohibit all reproductions of their works, performances, and
phonograms, in any manner or form, permanent or temporary (including temporary
storage in electronic form). 229

In a footnote to the text, KORUS provides:
Each Party shall confine limitations or exceptions to the rights described in paragraph
1 to certain special cases that do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work,
performance, or phonogram, and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder. For greater certainty, each Party may adopt or maintain limitations or exceptions to the rights described in paragraph 1 for fair use, as long as any
such limitation or exception is confined as stated in the previous sentence. 230

By providing that parties “may” adopt fair use provisions, KORUS uses
permissive language to encourage acceptance of exceptions and limitations to
copyright protections. While it may seem minor, this is an important step toSee Christie, Waller & Weatherall, supra note 210, at 212 tbl.1.
Id. at 213; see also Beatrice Lindstrom, Scaling Back TRIPS-Plus: An Analysis of
Intellectual Property Provisions in Trade Agreements and Implications For Asia And The
Pacific, 42 INT’L L. & POL. 917, 963-64 (2010) (noting the Bush administration sought to
ensure IP focused trade agreements would reflect United States law).
226 See Mia K. Garlick, Locking up the Bridge on the Digital Divide - A Consideration of
the Global Impact of the U.S. Anti-Circumvention Measures for the Participation of Developing Countries in the Digital Economy, 20 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 941,
960-62 (2003) (“The U.S. has clearly established the DMCA’s anti-circumvention measures
as a trade issue in its bilateral and regional dealings with all countries.”).
227 See U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement art. 18.4 n.11, U.S.-Kor., Mar. 15, 2012 [hereinafter KORUS], http://bit.ly/korusFTA (“[E]ach Party may adopt or maintain limitations or
exceptions to the rights described in paragraph 1 for fair use . . .”).
228 Id. art. 18.4, ¶ 7(d).
229 Id. art. 18.4, ¶ 1.
230 Id. art. 18.4 n.11 (emphasis added).
224
225
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ward including much-needed flexibility into trade agreements.
The U.S. may be poised to take another step in this direction. The recently
negotiated TPP contains a fair use-like provision, which USTR introduced,
negotiated, and obtained from its trading partners. 231 The provision would require nations to “seek to achieve an appropriate balance in their copyright systems in providing copyright exceptions and limitations for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research.” 232
The TPP, if ratified by the U.S. Senate, would impose an obligation on parties
to adopt limitations and exceptions as part of its copyright framework:
Each Party shall endeavor to achieve an appropriate balance in its copyright and related rights system, inter alia by means of limitations or exceptions that are consistent
with Article QQ.G.16.1, including those for the digital environment, giving due consideration to legitimate purposes such as, but not limited to: criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, research, and other similar purposes; and facilitating
access to [AU oppose: published] works for persons who are blind, visually impaired,
or otherwise print [AU propose: or perceptually] disabled. 233

The draft consciously uses the word “shall” instead of “may.” 234 By mandating parties to at least “endeavor to achieve” a more balanced copyright scheme,
the TPP inches forward towards a more Internet-company friendly ecosystem
necessary for businesses to thrive internationally. 235
Stakeholders have opposed exporting an IP policy through trade agreements.
Particularly in recent years, industry members and even members of Congress
pushed lawmakers not to incorporate fair use-like protections in the TPP. 236
These advocates oppose export of the fair use doctrine through trade agreements. 237 Consequently, USTR’s adoption of fair use-like language was institutionally significant because it faced intense pressure not to adopt fair use.
The decision to include fair-use like language represents a clear indication
that the USTR is beginning to understand that more balanced IP policies must
be included in trade agreements going forward. In addition, Congress also has
made progress. While the 2007 TPA made no mention of limitations and ex231 Trans-Pacific
Partnership
Agreement,
ELEC.
FRONTIER
FOUND.,
http://bit.ly/1Vhy2OM (last visited Apr. 13, 2016).
232 USTR Introduces New Exceptions, supra note 213.
233 Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement, art. QQ.G.17, Oct. 5, 2015,
http://bit.ly/leakedTPP.
234 Michael Geist, The Trouble with the TPP, Day 5: Rights Holders “Shall” vs. Users
“May”, MICHAEL GEIST (Jan. 8, 2016), http://bit.ly/1Usy6cH.
235 Mike Masnick, Why Does the TPP Repeatedly Require Stronger Copyright, But When
It Comes to Public Rights… Makes it Voluntary? TECHDIRT (Aug. 6, 2015, 1:38 PM)
http://bit.ly/1IMlCTm.
236 Letter
from Organizations Opposing TPP to Congress (Jan. 7, 2016),
http://bit.ly/1WQtq1q.
237 Id.
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ceptions, the recently proposed TPA does:
[T]his section reflects the view of the Committee that U.S. trade agreements should
contain copyright provisions that provide adequate and effective protection for U.S.
right holders as well as foster an appropriate balance in copyright systems, inter alia
by means of limitations and exceptions consistent with the internationally recognized
3-step test. 238

This directive is crucially stronger than USTR’s leaked text. In modifying
the promotion of limitations and exceptions, Congress dropped the “endeavor
to achieve” modifier.
B. Today’s Trade Priorities
The United States has taken steps toward reforming its trade bodies and policies to better reflect changing consumer needs and marketplace realities over
the years. Yet, the structure and resource allocation within the primary trade
offices in the U.S. demonstrate a clear gap in trade policy with regard to the
Internet and access to information.
At other points in U.S. trade history, Congress has acted to recalibrate trade
policy to address imbalances in trade priorities. The passage of the Trade Act
of 1974 is exemplary. 239 Then, amidst a negative economic environment and
disparate treatment of trade partners among countries, Congress was motivated
by the need to “promote fairness and equity in the international trading system
and to prevent a serious deterioration in the spirit of economic cooperation that
is essential for the preservation of economic and political stability in a rapidly
changing world.” 240 It had been twelve years since Congress passed its most
recent trade act in 1962, and the Senate recognized the global economic downturn at that time “ha[d] been unfavorable to this country, largely because of the
antiquated rules of the international trade … systems and the related lack of
genuine cooperation and reciprocity in international economic relations.” 241
Today, the U.S. is again at a crossroads where over twelve years have already
passed since it substantially reviewed and renewed its trade policies. 242 While
the economic conditions are not as dire as they were in the early 1970s, U.S.
Internet companies are facing protectionist attacks around the globe. 243 And,
S. REP. NO. 114-42, at 17 (2015).
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1979 (1974); Kazimierz Grzybowski
et al., Towards Integrated Management of International Trade – The U.S. Trade Act of
1974, 26 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 283, 293 (1977) (stating that while trade liberalization was the
main target of the Act, it also contained techniques and procedures that permitted the U.S.
government to trade competition).
240 S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 5 (1974), http://1.usa.gov/201S0fG.
241 Id. at 15.
242 Id.
243 See James Vincent, Obama Accuses EU of Attacking American Tech Companies Be238
239
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many of the Internet policies we take for granted in the U.S. have not been
adopted by other countries. 244
Congress could adopt reforms to U.S. trade bodies and practices similar to
those adopted as part of the 1974 Trade Act. First, Congress could establish an
ambassador, an office, an ITAC, and a supporting data and analysis group for
each major industry. Creating a clear, linear structure through which information on each industry could flow would achieve greater efficiency and consistency within and across agencies. Next, Congress should build upon perhaps
the greatest reform implemented under the Act: establishment of the system of
ITACs. 245
At the time, Congress regarded the multilateral trade negotiations to be conducted under its legislation to be the “most comprehensive ever conducted”
and determined “the need for the Government to seek information and advice
from the private sector is more important than ever before.” 246 Further, the
Senate noted that private advisory groups would provide “policy and technical
advice prior to, and throughout, the negotiations” and would issue formal reports at the conclusion of agreements affecting their sectors, with an eye toward the equity and mutuality achieved. 247 In addition, the Act provided fasttrack authority to the executive branch with the purpose of facilitating “fair and
equitable conditions of trade.” 248 Finally, the Act empowered the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC, the former U.S. Tariff Commission) to conduct renegotiation procedures, including public hearings and advisory reports
to assess the probable economic effect of draft terms. 249 Generally, the act resulted in reduced overall trade barriers. 250 Transparency and information was
cause it ‘Can’t Compete’, THE VERGE (Feb. 17, 2015, 7:06 AM), http://bit.ly/1A2ivXw.
244 Id. (stating that Germany’s policies are more sensitive towards personal data intrusion, and that EU citizens petitioned Google to remove links from some search results).
245 See Trade Act of 1974 § 135(f)(2) (stating that the provisions of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act apply to all other advisory committees established by the President or requesting organizations); see also Industry Trade Advisory Center, INT’L TRADE ADMIN.,
http://1.usa.gov/1LOni2Y (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
246 S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 101; see also Dennis A. Rondinelli, Partnering for Development: Government-Private Sector Cooperation in Service Provision 1 (2002),
http://bit.ly/21BFQLE.
247 S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 21.
248 Id.; U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, PUB. NO. 4094, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SIGNIFICANT U.S. IMPORT RESTRAINTS 74 (2009) [hereinafter ITC, ECONOMIC EFFECTS],
http://1.usa.gov/1XTncfS (“This authority signaled the seriousness of the administration’s
intent when negotiating with trade partners and helped to speed up negotiations by limiting
Congress’s role to setting negotiating objectives and active consultation.”).
249 Trade Act of 1974 §§ 172-175. The 2002 Act later increased USITC’s authority to
conduct probable economic effect investigations and other research initiatives. Andean
Trade Preference Act of 2002 § 371, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933 (2002).
250 Trade Act of 1974, INVESTOPEDIA, http://bit.ly/21Gh8K6 (last visited Feb. 17, 2016).
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the answer.
These reforms have been considered successful. The ITAC system in particular has been lauded as useful in identifying market-opening opportunities, and
the GAO recognized that the advisory committee system’s unique features
“give it an important role in U.S. trade policy.” 251 Together, the reforms—in
addition to others adopted under the act—resulted in an increase in trade from
less than 5% of GDP in 1974 to nearly 10% of GDP for exports and nearly
15% of GDP for imports in 2008. 252 Trade share has tripled to 27% by 2010
since 1970. 253
Similarly today, the TPA, TPP, and T-TIP agreements individually, and together, will have a substantial effect on the economy both in the U.S. and
abroad. For 2016, President Obama has made international trade a significant
focus—laying out “the most ambitious trade agenda in a generation”—in his
efforts to conclude the TPP agreement and the T-TIP. 254 Together, the partners
to those agreements will make up a market that accounts for 85% of foreign
direct investment, employs five million Americans, and buys 62% of U.S. exports. 255 The agreements thus have the potential of increasing U.S. exports by
more than $100 billion per year when implemented, which corresponds to supporting between 5,400 to 5,900 jobs. 256
The stated objectives of these agreements are to establish transparency and
consistency of the regulatory environments to enable businesses to operate
across regions, support access to supplies and information, and promote innovation. 257 Again, in order to achieve these objectives, structural reforms to U.S.
trade authorities are necessary. While the ITAC system established under the
1974 Trade Act is still intact, it must be updated to reflect one of the most important economic sectors to today’s economies: the Internet. USTR could create an ITAC for the Internet and an ITAC for Access to Information composed
of Internet representatives and representatives of the information economy,
including consumer groups. Next, Congress could appoint an Ambassador for
Access to Information and an Ambassador for the Internet, who each will promote Internet-friendly laws. Additionally, creation of an Office of Information
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-876, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: ADVICOMMITTEE SYSTEM SHOULD BE UPDATED TO BETTER SERVE U.S. POLICY NEEDS 10
(2002) [hereinafter GAO, ADVISORY COMMITTEE].
252 ITC, ECONOMIC EFFECTS, supra note 248, at 60 fig.3.1 (noting the share of exports
and imports of GDP from 1930 to 2008).
253 Id.
254 OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 2015
BUDGET 1 (2014) [hereinafter USTR FY2015 BUDGET], http://bit.ly/USTRFY15.
255 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET SUBMISSION: FISCAL YEAR
2016, at USTR-3 (2015) [hereinafter FY2016 BUDGET], http://bit.ly/CBSFY2016.
256 Id.
257 TPP U.S. Objectives, supra note 7.
251
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Access and the Internet (“OIAI”) would allow the Department of Commerce
(“DoC”) to provide an affiliated office with access to the DoC’s resources.
To the extent practicable, the balance of protections and exceptions provided
by the free speech provisions, fair use, the DMCA, Section 230, as well as related policies, should be incorporated into future trade agreements. The U.S.
will not succeed in advancing these legal and policy objectives, however,
without support from and resources within trade authorities. Given the increasingly vital role of the Internet to not just sales of online goods, but to global
trade, democratic discourse, and innovation, U.S. trade authorities should dedicate significantly greater resources to advancing trade policies that provide the
legal certainty and symmetry necessary to promote information access and the
Internet economy.
IV. CURRENT U.S. TRADE AUTHORITY STRUCTURE
The Office of the USTR has primary responsibility for a majority of U.S.
trade policy. 258 The head of the USTR, the U.S. Trade Representative, is a cabinet member and serves as the President’s principal trade advisor. 259 About 30
senior officials, who are lawyers and economists, support USTR. 260 These include ambassadors, deputies, and assistant USTRs dedicated to specific policy
objectives or industries. 261 In FY2015, USTR reported 233 full-time equivalent
employees and a budget of nearly $55 million. 262 In addition, other executive
branch agencies, particularly the DoC, as well as the private sector, NGOs and
local governments contribute to the development of trade policy. 263

258 Interagency Role, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., http://1.usa.gov/1RkUEab (last visited
Feb. 13, 2016).
259 Mission of the USTR, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., http://1.usa.gov/24zOfkZ (last
visited Feb. 13, 2016).
260 Biographies of Key Officials, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., http://1.usa.gov/1XZ6Anb
(last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
261 Id.
262 FY2016 BUDGET, supra note 255, at USTR-10 (2015) (estimating $56,268,000 in
appropriations for salaries and expenses and 240 full-time equivalent employees for
FY2016).
263 USTR FY2015 BUDGET, supra note 254, at 52.

2016]

Recalibrating U.S. Trade Policy

353

264

The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 created an interagency trade policy mechanism to assist USTR with implementation of these responsibilities. 265 The
Trade Policy Review Group (“TPRG”) and the Trade Policy Staff Committee
(“TPSC”) were established to create a consultative mechanism by which
USTR would consult with other government agencies. 266 The TPSC comprises
of members from twenty Federal agencies and offices, and more than ninety
subcommittees responsible for specialized areas. 267 All decisions made by these
organizations require consensus, and the Office of Policy Coordination advises
USTR on how to resolve policy differences among the agencies. 268 “The Office
is also responsible for eliciting advice from the public on policy decisions and

GAO, ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 251, at 6 fig.1.
Interagency Role, supra note 258.
266 See Scott D. McBride, Something Wicked This Way Comes: The United States Government’s Response to Unsafe Imported Chinese Toys and Subsidized Chinese Exports, 45
TEX. INT’L L.J. 233, 269-70 (2009).
267 Id.; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-167, USTR WOULD
BENEFIT FROM GREATER USE OF STRATEGIC HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES 1215 (2005) [GAO, USTR WOULD BENEFIT].
268 Interagency Role, supra note 258. On average, the office negotiates agreement on 285
policy papers and negotiating documents annually and chairs 54 TPSC and TPRG meetings.
Id.
264
265
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negotiations through public hearings and Federal Register notices.” 269 The
TPSC reports to the TPRG, who in turn reports to the National Economic
Council (“NEC”) chaired by the President. 270
USTR’s outside advisors include a system of Industry Trade Advisory
Committees (“ITACs”). 271 The system is managed under the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs & Policy Engagement (IAPE), in cooperation with the
Department of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and Environmental Protection
Agency. 272 The IAPE is also tasked as the state coordinator for the WTO and
NAFTA. 273 The Advisory Committees’ tasks are to provide information and
advice regarding U.S. negotiating objectives and bargaining positions before
entering into trade agreements, and on enforcement and compliance once the
agreement has been entered. 274 The system consists of 16 ITACs, totaling approximately hundreds of industry representatives. 275 The committees are appointed either by USTR alone or in conjunction with other Cabinet officers. 276
Each committee is required to prepare an annual report on proposed trade
agreements. 277
The ITAC system is arranged into three tiers consisting of the President’s
Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations (“ACTPN”), four specialized policy advisory committees, and twenty-two technical and sectoral
advisory committees. 278 The ACTPN is made up of forty-five members appointed by the President for two-year terms. 279 The Intergovernmental Policy
Advisory Committee (“IGPAC”) and one of the specialized policy committees—the Trade Advisory Committee on Africa (“TACA”)—are managed
solely by the USTR. 280 The USTR and the Department of Agriculture, Department of Labor, and the Environmental Protection Agency jointly manage the
other three specialized policy committees: the Agricultural Advisory Committee, Labor Advisory Committee, and Trade and Environmental Policy Commit-

Id.
WORLD TRADE ORG., WT/TPR/S/275, TRADE POLICY AND INVESTMENT REGIMES 14,
cht.II.1 (2012), http://bit.ly/1QPJYpD.
271 Advisory Committees, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., http://1.usa.gov/1oX4kkP (last
visited Feb. 13, 2016).
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Industry’s
Voice
in
U.S.
Trade
Policy,
INT’L
TRADE
ADMIN.,
http://1.usa.gov/1QqObOD (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
275 Mission of the USTR, supra note 259.
276 Id.
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 Id.
269
270
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tee. 281
Additionally, the DoC supports the USTR. 282 The Department is comprised
of 12 bureaus and 47,000 employees. 283 There is a dedicated bureau for International Trade Administration (“ITA”). 284 The ITA is organized into three
business units that work together to strengthen the competitiveness of the US
industry, promote trade and investment, and enforce fair trade and compliance
with trade laws and agreements: Industry and Analysis; Enforcement and
Compliance; and Global Markets. 285
The USTR also works substantially with Congress on trade issues, primarily
with the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on
Finance, and their respective subcommittees. 286 In addition, five members from
each chamber are appointed as official advisors on trade policy under statute. 287
A. Weaknesses of U.S. Trade Authority Structure
Each trade body generally focuses on the same major industries. 288 However,
there is a marked lack of consistency in the way resources are allocated both
within trade entities and across the various agencies that contribute to trade
policy. 289 Most trade bodies have a dedicated leader, office, advisory group,
and industry analysis focus on the more traditional industries, like agriculture
or labor. 290 However, for many other industry sectors, the agency lacks a dedicated high-ranking official, an office, advisory system or significant focus
within the relevant industry analysis division. 291 This potentially causes any
number of issues: incomplete coverage of developments or new data in the
industry; breakdown in communication within the agency; lack of private secAdvisory Committees, supra note 271.
International Trade Administration (ITA), U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
http://1.usa.gov/24vHssM (last visited Feb. 14, 2016).
283 About Commerce, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, http://1.usa.gov/1n8zJyQ (last visited
Feb. 14, 2016).
284 International Trade Administration (ITA), supra note 282.
285 Id.
286 Mission of the USTR, supra note 259.
287 Id.
288 Compare Issue Areas, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., http://1.usa.gov/1QpSeas (last
visited Feb. 11, 2016), with Data & Analysis, INT’L TRADE ADMIN.,
http://1.usa.gov/23bXs1r (last visited Apr. 1, 2016), and Trade, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://1.usa.gov/1MOPUxn (last visited Apr. 1, 2016).
289 Industry & Analysis, INT’L TRADE ADMIN. (Jan. 19, 2016), http://1.usa.gov/1PQPAsP;
Organization, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., http://1.usa.gov/23bXGp9 (last visited Apr. 1,
2016) [hereinafter USTR Organiztion].
290 See, e.g., Industry & Analysis, supra note 289; USTR Organization, supra note 289.
291 See e.g., infra note 311 and accompanying text; infra Section IV.A.2 (discussing the
lack of an ITAC dedicated to the Internet); infra Section IV.A.2 (discussing the asymmetrical structure of the ITA’s OTEC).
281
282
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tor perspective and expertise; or insufficient advocacy at the leadership level or
to the public. Any one of these bottlenecks can leave certain objectives or industry issues under-represented or left out of trade policy. That is certainly the
case with regard to the Internet economy.
1. Office of the United States Trade Representative
The USTR focuses its trade policy in fourteen primary issue areas: Agriculture, 292 Economy and Trade, 293 Environment, 294 Government Procurement, 295
Industry and Manufacturing, 296 Intellectual Property, 297 Labor, 298 Preference
Programs, 299 Services and Investment, 300 Small Business, 301 Textiles and Apparel, 302 Trade and Development, 303 and Trade Organizations. 304
We recommend the appointment of Ambassadors for Information Access
and for the Internet in order to bring the USTR’s trade priorities closer to
alignment with the Internet age. Under the current framework, it is too easy for
“innovation” to take a second-seat to “intellectual property.” 305 Indeed, the
stated mission of the USTR’s Office of Intellectual Property and Innovation
(“IPN”) is promoting “strong intellectual property laws and effective enforce292 Agriculture, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., http://1.usa.gov/1VOpJKM (last visited Feb.
11, 2016).
293 Economy & Trade, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., http://1.usa.gov/1QxeCxp (last visited Feb. 11, 2016).
294 Environment
& Natural Resources, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP.,
http://1.usa.gov/231iTQO (last visited Feb. 11, 2016).
295 Government Procurement, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., http://1.usa.gov/1rd0eWz
(last visited Feb. 11, 2016).
296 Industry & Manufacturing, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., http://1.usa.gov/1SuTc6l (last
visited Feb. 11, 2016).
297 Intellectual Property, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., http://1.usa.gov/21cOYFP (last
visited Feb. 11, 2016).
298 Labor, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., http://1.usa.gov/1Tt5jD6 (last visited Feb. 11,
2016).
299 Preference Programs, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., http://1.usa.gov/1NtN5Cd (last
visited Feb. 11, 2016).
300 Services & Investment, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., http://1.usa.gov/1SuTppY (last
visited Feb. 11, 2016).
301 Small Business, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., http://1.usa.gov/1WQqd20 (last visited
Feb. 11, 2016).
302 Textiles & Apparel, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., http://1.usa.gov/1NLYJDu (last visited Feb. 11, 2016).
303 Trade & Development, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., http://1.usa.gov/24zOwEM (last
visited Feb. 12, 2016).
304 Trade Organizations, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., http://1.usa.gov/1QSgcR2 (last
visited Feb. 12, 2016).
305 Intellectual Property, supra note 297.
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ment worldwide.” 306 Its reports detail progress in implementing IP policies under its agreements, but predominantly focus on infringement and enforcement,
only mentioning the Internet in the context of “piracy” and domain name registry. 307 The “key areas of work” for IPN include “implementation of trade policy
in support of U.S. innovations,” but this is highlighted in the context of pharmaceutical and medical technology industries. 308 These practices exemplify the
asymmetrical focus of U.S. IP policy in trade on protections rather than promoting use and access and the failure of trade policy to include the Internet as
a primary platform for innovation. 309
USTR’s organizational structure should also be reformed to better reflect the
focus of its trade policy. 310 While the Deputy USTR has jurisdiction over several issue areas, it lacks a dedicated branch for over half of them. 311 The USTR
Id.
See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REP., 2014 OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW OF NOTORIOUS MARKETS 10 (2015),
http://1.usa.gov/1x0AJ7g.
308 Intellectual Property, supra note 297.
309 See generally GOOGLE, ENABLING TRADE IN THE ERA OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES: BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS TO THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION 8-11 (2010),
http://bit.ly/1oQPr3o (examining how restrictions on Internet governance hamper innovation
on trade within the Internet economy); Bob Boorstin, Promoting Free Trade for the Internet
Economy, GOOGLE PUB. POL’Y (Nov. 15, 2010), http://bit.ly/1UsuozW.
310 See Organizational Chart, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., http://1.usa.gov/21BCRTg
(last visited Feb. 14, 2016) [hereinafter USTR Org. Chart].
311 In the USTR, the number and type of staff devoted to each issue area varies greatly,
and USTR leadership structure does not actually track the primary issue areas USTR names
as its central focus for trade policy. For instance, USTR combines the “Industry & Manufacturing,” “Small Business,” and “Trade & Development” issues under the “Small Business, Market Access and Industrial Competitiveness” leadership division. As another example, it is unclear which employees focus on “Preference Programs” or “Textiles & Apparel” issues, as no leadership group appears dedicated to those areas. As of summer 2015,
USTR leadership was comprised as follows: Agriculture and Cultural Affairs: 1 Chief Agricultural Negotiator (Ambassador), 1 Assistant US Trade Rep. 2 Deputy Assistant US Trade
Rep., 6 Directors of Agricultural Affairs; Monitoring and Enforcement: 1 Assistant US
Trade Rep, 2 Deputy Assistant US Trade Rep, 1 Senior Counsel for Dispute Settlement;
Environment & Natural Resources: 1 Assistant US Trade Rep., 1 Deputy Assistant US
Trade Rep., 2 Directors of International Environmental Pol., 1 Director of Natural Resources Policy; Intellectual Property and Innovation: 1 Assistant US Trade Rep., 2 Deputy
Assistant US Trade Rep., 2 Director of Intellectual Property and Innov.; Labor: 1 Assistant
US Trade Rep., 2 Deputy Assistant US Trade Rep.; Services and Investment: 1 Assistant
US Trade Rep., 3 Deputy Assistant US Trade Rep., 1 Director of Investment Affairs, 1 Director of Services and Investments, 3 Director of Trade Negotiations; Small Business, Market Access and Industrial Competitiveness: 1 Assistant US Trade Rep., 3 Deputy Assistant
US Trade Rep., 1 Director of Non-Tariff Barriers, 1 Director of Industry Trade Policy, 1
Director of Market Access, 1 Director of Steel Trade Policy, 1 Director of Tariff Policy;
Trade Policy and Economics: 1 Assistant US Trade Rep., 1 Deputy Assistant US Trade
Rep., 1 Director of Policy Planning; WTO and Multilateral Affairs: 1 Assistant US Trade
Rep., 1 Deputy Assistant US Trade Rep., 1 Senior Director for Technical Barriers, 1 Senior
Director for WTO Accessions, 1 Senior Director for WTO Affairs, 1 Director of Customs
306
307
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should undertake further reforms to unify the flow of work on issue areas from
the research and analysis division all the way up through leadership. The disjointed nature of the agency has likely contributed significantly to the disparate
focus on various industries, and a reformed structure will prove to be more
efficient.
Current free trade agreements (FTAs) provide insight into the effects of organizational issues on the advancement of various trade policy objectives to
USTR. The FTAs generally include more discussion and detail for those traditional sectors of the economy in which the U.S. has been involved in either
import or export of products for decades. 312 For example, FTAs dedicate by far
the most pages to the finance and investment, and textiles and apparel industries: over 600 and nearly 300 pages, respectively. 313 Textiles and related materials, like cotton, have also traditionally been a major trade item for the US. 314
However, finance accounted for 7%—meriting significant focus in FTAs—
while textiles made up less than 1% of GDP in 2014. 315 This disparate coverage
indicates a failure of USTR to update its FTAs to reflect current economic realities. 316 Since textiles are one industry that lacks a coherent structure within
USTR, inconsistencies in FTA coverage may be due to a weaknesses in organization and resource allocation within the USTR. 317
While the proportion of FTAs dedicated to these industries may not track
GDP, it is clear that FTAs fall short in their coverage of Internet-related poliAffairs, 1 Director of Customs Subsidies, 1 Director of Trade Policy Reviews, 1 Director of
Trade Remedies, 1 Director of WTO Affairs. See FEDERAL YELLOW BOOK, EXECUTIVE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT [EOP] 31-34 (2015).
312 See generally North American Free Trade Agreement chs. 3, 11, 13, 17, U.S.-Can.Mex., Jan. 1, 1994 [hereinafter NAFTA].
313 Australia FTA, supra note 200, chs. 4, 11, 13; United States-Bahrain Free Trade
Agreement chs. 3, 11, U.S.-Bahr., Sept. 14, 2004 [hereinafter Bahrain FTA],
http://bit.ly/BahFTA; Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement chs. 3,
10, 12, U.S.-Dom. Rep.-Costa Rica-El Sal.-Guat.-Hond.-Nicar., Aug. 2, 2005 [hereinafter
CAFTA-DR], http://bit.ly/CAFTADR; Chile FTA, supra note 214, chs. 4, 10, 12; Colombia
TPA, supra note 200, chs. 3, 10, 12; KORUS, supra note 227, chs. 4, 11, 13; United StatesMorocco Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, chs. 4, 10, 12, June 15, 2004 [hereinafter
Morocco FTA], http://bit.ly/MorocFTA; United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement, U.S.Oman, chs. 3, 10, 12, Sept. 26, 2006 [hereinafter Oman FTA], http://bit.ly/OmanFTA; Panama-United States Trade Promotion Agreement, Pan.-U.S., chs. 4, 10, 12, June 28, 2007
[hereinafter Panama TPA], http://bit.ly/PanamaTPA; United States-Peru Trade Promotion
Agreement, U.S.-Peru, chs. 3, 10, 12, Apr. 12, 2006 [hereinafter Peru FTA],
http://bit.ly/PeruFTA; Singapore FTA, supra note 214, chs. 5, 10, 15.
314 The Cotton Industry: Bloom Times, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 20, 2011, at 42 (“Last year
America produced 18.3m bales—each bale weighing 480lb, or 218kg—and exported more
than 80% of them.”).
315 VALUE ADDED GDP DATA, supra note 56.
316 Holleyman NDN Address, supra note 58.
317 USTR Org. Chart, supra note 310.
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cies. 318 There is no industry category tracking the Internet economy specifically
to include companies that facilitate e-commerce, entertainment, social networking, and other Internet sectors. 319 Despite the clear importance of the Internet to the U.S. GDP, only 28 pages of all FTA agreements together mentioned the Internet and did so without advancing the important policy objectives that resulted in the success of the Internet economy to date. 320
Promoting values related to IP protections have received more attention in
recent years. 321 Since the finalization of the TRIPS Agreement in 1994 and the
WIPO Copyright Treaties in 1996, FTAs have contained increasingly substantial IP sections;322 IP chapters of at least 30 pages seem to be standard. 323 But
these agreements fail to adequately address policies that provide protections
similar to those available under the First Amendment, fair use, and Section
230. 324 Clearly, IP trade policy has focused predominantly on copyright enforcement and anti-piracy provisions, while fair use-like language has yet to be
updated into an agreement. 325 Whether as an industry or policy focus area, the
USTR should promote predictable Internet liability rules to ensure the continued growth of the Internet and the industries it supports.
Public advocacy by the USTR and USTR Ambassadors also shows the
comparable lack of attention to the Internet or information access issues in current trade priorities. In the years since the commercial adoption of the Internet,
only two speeches by USTR have addressed the Internet. 326 Only one of these
meaningfully addressed the policy concerns relevant to the Internet today. 327 In
318 The “information” industry alone accounted for 4.8% of GDP in 2014. This industry
includes publishers, software, motion pictures, sound recordings, broadcasting and telecommunications, data processing, Internet publishing, and other information services.
Namely, the content that consumers increasingly access online. VALUE ADDED GDP DATA,
supra note 56.
319 Holleyman NDN Address, supra note 58.
320 See, e.g., Australia FTA, supra note 200, ch.16; Bahrain FTA, supra note 313, ch.13;
CAFTA-DR, supra note 313, ch.14; Chile FTA, supra note 214, ch.15; Colombia FTA,
supra note 200, ch.15; KORUS, supra note 227, ch. 15; Morocco FTA, supra note 313,
ch.14; Oman FTA, supra note 313, ch.14; Panama TPA, supra note 313, ch.14; Peru TPA,
supra note 313, ch.15; Singapore FTA, supra note 214, ch.14.
321 See Anupam Chander, Exporting DCMA Lockouts, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 205, 211
(2006).
322 See Keeping Our Balance in the Face of Piracy and Counterfeiting: Limiting the
Scope of Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Provisions in Free Trade Agreements, 42
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 159, 171-72 (2010) [hereinafter Keeping Our Balance].
323 Chander, supra note 321 at 216. See, e.g., Australia FTA, supra note 200, ch.17 (29
pages); KORUS, supra note 227, ch.18 (34 pages); Panama TPA, supra note 313, ch.14 (32
pages).
324 Kaminski, supra note 194, at 982.
325 See generally Keeping Our Balance, supra note 322, at 173; see also generally Kaminski, supra note 194, at 982.
326 Holleyman NDN Address, supra note 58.
327 Id.
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his speech, Deputy USTR Robert Holleyman recognized how the Internet has
transformed the global economy and called for action to modernize the international trading system to promote an Internet-enabled economy for the future:
I am speaking today about the digital economy and trade as a 21st century leadership
imperative, because we stand at a crossroad. The rules we have in place in the international trading system—historically championed by the U.S. I will add—have served
us well, so far. They have helped enable the explosive growth of the Internet and dissemination of new technology, have led to rapid changes that have brought us closer
together, allowed us to trade across borders, and have allowed some of the world’s
greatest innovations to emanate from our shores. However, as someone who has
worked at the intersection of technology and international trade for over two decades,
I can speak with confidence when I say this: the trading rules that have helped us get
to where we are today are no longer sufficient. 328

Deputy USTR Holleyman explained further that:
The United States is also supporting provisions—for the first time in any trade agreement—that will promote balance in copyright systems through exceptions and limitations for legitimate purposes, such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship, and research, including with respect to the digital environment.” 329

The Office of the USTR should build on Deputy Holleyman’s vision, especially as the Internet will become ubiquitous in increasingly more areas of
commerce, entertainment, and social discourse. 330 As this occurs, the Internet
will challenge existing legal and regulatory structures around the globe. With
the appropriate high level leadership, USTR can become a force for ensuring
that such structures are appropriately dismantled or modified to facilitate the
Internet’s growth.
2. Industry Trade Advisory Committees
The ITAC system is crucial to the formation of trade policy. As the GAO
found:
The advisory committee system is unique in U.S. trade policy because it provides a
forum in which business and other interested groups can consult confidentially with
and provide advice to the executive branch on trade negotiations, U.S. trade policy,
and implementation of trade agreements. The formal nature of advisory meetings
helps ensure that representatives of the private sector and other groups have regular
access to officials engaged in U.S. trade policy. Further, the system provides government officials with a body of private sector experts with whom they can develop an
ongoing dialogue. 331
328 Id. The USTR addressed the Internet or access to information in just one speech in
2008 and one speech in 2015. Speeches/Transcripts, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP.,
http://1.usa.gov/1N5tFOJ (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).
329 Holleyman NDN Address, supra note 58.
330 JANNA ANDERSON ET AL., PEW RES. CTR., DIGITAL LIFE IN 2025, at 5 (2014),
http://pewrsr.ch/1nEvSoK.
331 GAO, ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 251, at 10-11.
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Former USTR officials have called the ITAC system “one of the great
strengths of U.S. trade policy.” 332 USTR and officials from the Department of
Commerce alike have reported that the ITAC system has made valuable contributions to U.S. trade policy over the years including in negotiations: (1)
“multilateral agreements on information technology, financial services, and
basic telecommunications; (2) the Uruguay Round of negotiations that led to
establishment of the WTO; (3) as well as regional initiatives such as the North
American Free Trade Agreement, the Summit of the Americas, and the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation forum.” 333 Negotiators commenting on the system in the early 2000s have said that because it is institutionalized and seeks to
be representative, it is a preferred means of obtaining input on trade policy. 334
However, in its 2007 review of FTAs and private sector consultations under
the 2002 TPA, GAO had found that USTR needed to improve its management
of the ITAC system. 335 Its recommendations included improving information
access for the committees, improving timeliness of re-chartering the committees, and providing more notice and time for the committees to meaningfully
weigh in on trade policy. 336 USTR should review and reform all ITACs to ensure that they are representative of each issue area. But in particular, it should
form a new ITAC dedicated to the Internet and a second dedicated to access to
information.
There are sixteen technical and sectoral advisory committees that represent
industry and agriculture. 337 Despite the fact that these industries make broadly
varying contributions to the U.S. economy, each ITAC is given approximately
the same budget, operating procedure, and membership. 338 In general, Congress
Id. at 11.
Id.
334 Id.
335 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-59, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: AN
ANALYSIS OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND CONGRESSIONAL AND PRIVATE SECTOR CONSULTATIONS UNDER TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY 67 (2007).
336 See generally id. at 52-65.
337 MICHAEL B. G. FROMAN, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 206
(2014), http://1.usa.gov/1oA1elA.
These committees are: Aerospace Equipment (ITAC 1); Automotive Equipment and Capital
Goods (ITAC 2); Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, Health/Science Products and Services (ITAC
3); Consumer Goods (ITAC 4); Distribution Services (ITAC 5); Energy and Energy Services (ITAC 6); Forest Products (ITAC 7); Information and Communication Technologies
Services and Electronic Commerce (ITAC 8); Non-Ferrous Metals and Building Materials
(ITAC 9); Services and Finance Industries (ITAC 10); Small and Minority Business (ITAC
11); Steel (ITAC 12); Textiles and Clothing (ITAC 13); Customs Matters and Trade Facilitation (ITAC 14); Intellectual Property Rights (ITAC 15); and Standards and Technical
Trade Barriers (ITAC 16).
Id.
338 Each ITAC has operating costs between $40,000 to $60,000 per year, irregular meetings at the call of the Secretary or USTR, and not more than 50 members. See, e.g., Industry
332
333
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should undertake a review of the ITAC system to ensure the resources allocated to an ITAC meet the needs of a given sector, particularly as sectors develop
and change over time.
In particular, since the inception of the ITAC system, the Internet has revolutionized the economy. 339 But there is no ITAC dedicated to the Internet. The
Information and Communications Technologies, Services, and Electronic
Commerce ITAC is the closest to an Internet ITAC, but its focus goes well
beyond the Internet. 340 This group is focused predominantly on the technologies and infrastructure that make e-commerce, and trade online possible. 341
However, the ITAC does not account for the consumer-facing benefits of the
Internet, or that fact that the Internet is its own ecosystem of users, sellers, entrepreneurs, and creators. 342
The membership of this ITAC is telling. There are sixteen members, which
include representatives from NETGEAR, Inc., Intel, and the Internet Infrastructure coalition (“IIC”). 343 These companies serve an important function in
the Internet ecosystem: they build the ‘nuts and bolts’ of the Internet, or other
technologies that facilitate the transmission of information through the web,
and to the user. 344 For instance, IIC configures the physical network of netTrade Advisory Committee on Automotive Equipment and Capital Goods Charter arts. 7,
10, http://1.usa.gov/1UUj01y; Information and Communications Technologies, Services,
and Electronic Commerce Charter arts. 7, 10, http://1.usa.gov/1KVecVP; Industry Trade
Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property Rights Charter arts. 7, 10,
http://1.usa.gov/239umTV.
339 See Internet Technical Advisory Committee to the OECD Charter art. II,
http://bit.ly/1VLNrDE.
340 Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Information and Communications Technologies, Services, and Electronic Commerce Charter art. 3, http://1.usa.gov/1KVecVP.
341 Id. art. 4.
342 MANYIKA & ROXURGH, supra note 42, at 1.
343 Industry Trade Advisory Committee On Information and Communications Technologies, Services, and Electronic Commerce ITAC 8, INT’L TRADE ADMIN.,
http://bit.ly/24zKVGy (last visited Feb. 22, 2016). The full membership includes: Jacquelynn Ruff, Verizon Communications Inc.; Jennifer H. Sanford, Cisco Systems, Inc.; Arun K.
Bhumitra, Arjay Telecommunications; Daniel W. Caprio, Jr., DC Strategies Consulting,
LLC; Steven D. Domenikos, Ierion/Relay Dental, Inc., Dean Fealk, DLA Piper LLC Representing NETGEAR, Inc.; Arun P. Gupta, Caterpillar, Inc.; Jake E. Jennings, AT&T Services, Inc.; Todd R. Loewenstein, ArcoStream LLC; Jennifer A. Manner, EchStar Corp.;
Noel H. Nevshehir, Automation Alley; Wendy E. Owens, Divitius LLC; Greg S. Slater,
Intel Corp., W. David Snead, Internet Infrastructure (i2) Coalition; Roszel C. Thomsen II,
Alliance for Network Security; Stephen Zirschky, WatchGuard Technologies, Inc. Industry
Trade Advisory Committee On Information and Communications Technologies, Services,
and Electronic Commerce ITAC 8, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., http://bit.ly/24zKVGy (last visited
Feb. 22, 2016).
344 See JOHN DEIGHTON & JOHN QUELCH, HAMILTON CONSULTANTS, INC., ECONOMIC
VALUE OF THE ADVERTISING- SUPPORTED INTERNET ECOSYSTEM 6-7 (2009),
http://bit.ly/1VLNsaP.
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works that connects users around the globe. 345 While this and other technology-focused functions are crucial to the continued growth of the Internet, and
members in the ITAC should represent them, technology is less than half of the
full picture. The companies in the ITAC are not representative of the full ecosystem of the Internet. 346
3. Department of Commerce
Like the other entities that contribute to U.S. trade policy, the Department of
Commerce’s decentralized structure lacks consistency. Its Industry Analysis
unit is focused on developing and executing innovative international trade and
investment policies and strategies. To support its objectives, ITA provides data
and analysis on various industries, which include: Aerospace; 347 Automotive; 348
Building Products, Construction, and Metals; 349 Construction; 350 Consumer
Goods; 351 E-Commerce, Information and Telecomm; 352 Energy and Environmental Industries; 353 Financial Service; 354 Health; 355 Machinery; 356 Textiles and
Apparel; 357 Service Industries; 358 and Travel and Tourism. 359
345 About i2Coalition, INTERNET INFRASTRUCTURE COAL., http://bit.ly/1WQyLWK (last
visited Apr. 22, 2016).
346 Zachary Scott Simmons, Other-than-Industry Representation on Industry Trade Advisory Committees, 31 U.C.L.A. PAC. BASIN. L.J. 147, 169-71 (2014) (arguing certain actors
are underrepresented in Industry Trade Advisory Committees).
347 Office of Transportation and Machinery – Aerospace Team, INT’L TRADE ADMIN.,
http://1.usa.gov/1TPs0nt (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
348 Office of Transportation and Machinery – Automotive Team, INT’L TRADE ADMIN.,
http://1.usa.gov/1rvnCPk (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
349 Office of Materials Industries, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., http://1.usa.gov/1XYZu1O (last
visited Feb. 22, 2016).
350 Id.
351 Office of Consumer Goods, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., http://1.usa.gov/1TPslGR (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
352 Office
of Technology and Electronic Commerce, INT’L TRADE ADMIN.,
http://1.usa.gov/1QlvtXo (last updated May 6, 2014).
353 Office
of Energy and Environmental Industries, INT’L TRADE ADMIN.,
http://1.usa.gov/1no9n52 (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
354 Office of Finance and Insurance, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., http://1.usa.gov/1Sgr2zE (last
visited Feb. 14, 2016).
355 Health Industries, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., http://1.usa.gov/1RkLz19 (last visited Feb.
22, 2016).
356 Office of Transportation and Machinery – Machinery Team, INT’L TRADE ADMIN.,
http://1.usa.gov/1YQNJKU (last visited Feb. 14, 2016).
357 Office of Textiles and Apparel, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., http://1.usa.gov/1pn3gGQ (last
visited Feb. 14, 2016).
358 Office of Supply Chain, Professional, and Business Services, INT’L TRADE ADMIN.,
http://1.usa.gov/1Uxexjt (last visited Feb. 14, 2016).
359 Office
of Travel and Tourism Industries, INT’L TRADE ADMIN.,
http://1.usa.gov/2177fmt (last visited Feb. 14, 2016).
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ITA has the Office of Technology and Electronic Commerce (“OTEC”) located within the Manufacturing and Services division. 360 It has three teams: ecommerce, information technology, and telecommunications. 361 And it produces numerous reports. 362 However, its coverage of the information industry suffers from similar issues as other “Internet”-focused trade entities: OTEC is
asymmetrically focused on protections and enforcement. 363 Many of the documents produced by the group cover policy issues related to data protection,
privacy, and cybersecurity. 364 While these areas are important, limiting intermediary liability, and promoting information sharing and access online are
crucial to the continued growth of the Internet, yet receive comparably little
attention. 365
Within the Department of Commerce’s ITA Bureau, Congress could establish a bureau dedicated to the Internet and Access to Information (“IAI”).
While the Department of Commerce does house other bureaus or offices whose
responsibilities may partially cover the Internet or related industries, 366 a dedi360 About OTEC, OFFICE OF TECH. & ELEC. COMMERCE, http://1.usa.gov/1Tg1IuV (last
updated Aug. 9, 2011).
361 Id.
362 OTEC’s site provides research by industry/sector for e-commerce, information technology, instrumentation, microelectronics, and telecommunications. However, these resources do not focus on current Internet law and policy issues. Instead, the resources available through each of these portals focus on equipment, infrastructure, hardware and software
for communication or for facilitating e-commerce. See Research by Industry/Sector, OFFICE
OF TECH. & ELEC. COMMERCE, http://1.usa.gov/25HAEsG, (last visited Apr. 4, 2016); see
also Publications and Newsletters, Office OF TECH. & ELEC. COMMERCE,
http://1.usa.gov/1Qng4n8 (last updated Feb. 28, 2016). The OTEC site also offers ExportIT
reports and market briefs. These materials again focus on the products and services that
enable the Internet to function. See ExportIT Reports & Market Briefs, Office OF TECH. &
ELEC. COMMERCE, http://1.usa.gov/1UExS3y (last visited Apr. 4, 2016). ITA’s “Global Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Newsletter” focused most recently on
international data protection, equipment and application export and competition trends. Its’
most recently released newsletters for most sectors date back to 2011. See Global Information and Communications Technology Newsletter, OFFICE OF TECH & ELEC. COMMERCE
(Dec. 2, 2011), http://1.usa.gov/25HAS31.
363 Trade Policy Issues, OFFICE OF TECH. & ELEC. COMMERCE, http://1.usa.gov/1RxFPDz
(last visited Feb. 14, 2016).
364 See, e.g., Office of Tech. and Elec. Commerce, United States-Japan Joint Statement
on Promoting Global Cyber Security - Final Draft (Sept. 9, 2003), http://1.usa.gov/1TLjLss;
Letter from Paula J. Bruening, Staff Counsel, The Ctr. for Democracy and Tech., to Eric M.
Holloway, Office of Tech. and Elec. Commerce (on file with The Office of Technology and
Electronic Commerce).
365 Trade Policy Issues, supra note 363.
366 See, e.g., Information Technology Portal – Overview, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS &
TECH., http://1.usa.gov/1QSdxa6 (last visited Feb. 14, 2016) (covering cybersecurity, cloud
computing, and other internet standards issues), About NTIS, NAT’L TECH. INFO. SERV.,
http://1.usa.gov/1WTWIKk (last visited Feb. 14, 2016) (promoting American innovation
through disseminating technical information to the public and industry).
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cated bureau would dedicate a higher level of attention and importance to Internet-related trade policy issues. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ought to
supplement and support the IAI. Additionally, the existing OTEC’s resources
are clearly outdated, and do not cover large segments of the Internet economy. 367 OTEC could continue to collect data on technologies related to the infrastructure and function of the Internet, while the IAI office would focus more
intensively on the content services. It is important that DoC have an office
providing current data and analysis of one of the significant and fastestgrowing sectors of the economy. A bureau focused on promoting the Internet
and information access values through trade agreements is necessary to bring
trade policy into the Internet age.
The Department of Commerce has taken an important step toward reforming
Internet trade policy. Recently, the DoC borrowed a strategy that has worked
well for the intellectual property sectors—coordinating with the Department of
State to ensconce Internet law and policy attachés in key embassies throughout
the world. 368 In March 2016, the DoC announced the launch of a “digital attaché program to address trade barriers.” 369 In announcing the program, Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker commendably recognized that “the entire
world [is] living through one of the most remarkable economic and society
transformations in history and it is being driven by technology. In this changing world, economic growth and competitiveness are increasingly tied to the
digital economy.” 370 To promote continued growth in both the United States
and abroad, the mission of such attachés should be to evangelize and educate
lawmakers, judges, and regulators in other jurisdictions about the laws that
make the Internet work. 371 Such attachés should also help U.S. Internet companies engage with appropriate jurisdictions when such companies face protec367 OTEC’s Publications and Newsletters have not been updated since 2011. See, e.g.,
Tim Miles, Green IT, OFFICE OF TECH. & ELEC. COMMERCE (May 5, 2010),
http://1.usa.gov/1UxgJHU; see also Global Information and Communications Technology
Newsletter, supra note 362.
368 Cf. Intellectual Property (IP) Attaché Program, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://1.usa.gov/1OX7EoW (last visited Apr. 22, 2016).
369 Penny Pritzker, Commerce Launches Digital Attaché Program to Address Trade Barriers, DEP’T OF COMMERCE (Mar. 11, 2016), http://1.usa.gov/23bYr1r. The DoC also rolled
out an agency-wide Digital Economy Agenda, which will guide the mission of the attaché
program in developing policies that reflect the Internet’s role as a global platform for democratic discourse, innovation, and commerce. See Alan B. Davidson, The Commerce Department’s Digital Economy Agenda, DEP’T OF COMMERCE (Nov. 9, 2015),
http://1.usa.gov/227B72z.
370 Pritzker, supra note 369.
371 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE:
PROSPERITY, SECURITY, AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD 17-19 (2011),
http://1.usa.gov/1JALJ5T.
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tionist or non-protectionist regulatory and legal barriers to providing services
in the jurisdiction. The Patent and Trademark Office and the Department of
State have had a similar program for the intellectual property industries for
years, where “intellectual property attachés” are placed in key embassies where
intellectual property industries face legal, regulatory or marketplace challenges. 372
4. Congress
Since the elevation of USTR to cabinet level in 1974, 373 and the corresponding formation of the ITAC system, hundreds of hearings have been dedicated
to trade issues. 374 From 1974 through 1980, there were 156 hearings on international trade. 375 However, only 13 of those—some 8%—covered IP-related issues, and none mentioned the Internet or access to information. 376 In the last
five years, there were 178 hearings on international trade and 43 of those—
roughly 24%—covered IP-related issues and only 12%—addressed Internet
related issues. 377 While this does demonstrate an improvement especially with
regard to IP issues, still more attention should be paid to ensuring that the inIntellectual Property (IP) Attaché Program, supra note 368.
Trade Act of 1974 § 141; About Us, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP.,
http://1.usa.gov/1QK5juo (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
374 Search
“International
Trade”,
PROQUEST
CONG.,
http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (totaling 772
hearings; follow the “Search” hyperlink; then enter “international trade” and select “committee hearings”; filter only “Senate Committee on Finance” and “House Ways and Means
Committee”; bounded by year 1974-2016).
375 Search
“International
Trade”,
PROQUEST
CONG.,
http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional (last visited Feb. 14, 2015) (totaling 156
hearings; follow the “Search” hyperlink; then enter “international trade” and select “committee hearings”; filter only “Senate Committee on Finance” and “House Ways and Means
Committee”; bounded by year 1974-1980).
376 Search
“International
Trade”,
PROQUEST
CONG.,
http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional (last visited Feb. 14, 2015) (totaling 13
hearings; follow the “Search” hyperlink; then enter “international trade” and filter by “intellectual property”; select “committee hearings” and filter only “Senate Committee on Finance” and “House Ways and Means Committee”; bounded by year 1974-1980).
377 Search
“International
Trade”,
PROQUEST
CONG.,
http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional (last visited Feb. 14, 2015) (totaling 178
hearings; follow the “Search” hyperlink; then enter “international trade” bounded by year
CONG.,
2010-2016);
Search
“International
Trade”,
PROQUEST
http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional (last visited Feb. 14, 2015) (totaling 43
hearings; follow the “Search” hyperlink; then enter “international trade” and “intellectual
property; bounded by year 2010-2016); Search “International Trade”, PROQUEST CONG.,
http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional (last visited Feb. 14, 2015) (totaling 23
hearings; follow the “Search” hyperlink; then enter “international trade” and “internet”;
bounded by year 2010-2016).
372
373
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formation access is a more central focus of Congress.
V. CONCLUSION: STRUCTURAL RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Creation of an Ambassador for Access to Information and an Ambassador
for the Internet within USTR
As the evidence above shows, USTR’s speeches and trade agreements dedicate the least attention to the Internet economy of any industry sector. Congress should establish an Ambassador for Access to Information and an Ambassador for the Internet, which will focus on promoting sound legal policies
that protect the Internet and promote access to information. These individuals
will oversee the proposed ITACs on the Internet and Access to Information,
and facilitate the relationship between USTR, ITACs, Congress, the Department of Commerce, and U.S. trade partners to advance these objectives.
B. Establishment of ITACs for the Internet and for Access to Information
Consistent with the current trend of expanding the role of ITACs as trade
policy develops, Congress should create an ITAC for the Internet and for Access to Information. Addressing these sectors of the economy and aspects of
trade policy through dedicated groups with perspective and support would significantly increase the ability of U.S. trade to reflect the importance of the Internet and information access today.
C. Creation of an Office of Information Access and the Internet with the
Department of Commerce
Creation of an Office of Information Access and the Internet (“OIAI”)
would allow the Department of Commerce to focus anew on the Internet and
information access. 378 Its OTEC teams could remain in place to support the
new Office, which would be centered on the legal and policy goals necessary
to protect and promote the Internet and Information access. OIAI could also
draw on NTIA, the Census Bureau and other bodies housed within Commerce
to advance its objectives.

CDD and USPIRG Urge Commerce Department to Protect Consumers Online, CTR.
28, 2011) http://bit.ly/1LO6hV3 (“The Department of Commerce is not
positioned to play a leading role formulating and enacting meaningful public policies ensuring that consumers can have trust in the digital marketing environment.”).
378
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D. Establish a Program within the Department of Commerce to Place “Internet
attachés” in key embassies.
The Department should model its newly-launched digital attaché program
after the existing “intellectual property attaché” program to place Internet policy experts in embassies around the world, where U.S. Internet companies face
legal, regulatory, or marketplace challenges. Such attaches would serve to
evangelize with local judges, lawmakers, and regulators the laws and policies
that make the Internet work. In addition, such attaches could assist U.S. Internet companies that face specific challenges in jurisdictions abroad. Supported
by stronger Internet-focused bodies and policies in other U.S. trade entities, the
attaché will support U.S. businesses, promote trade, and export the laws and
policies that have driven the rise of the Internet economy.

